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I. AN EXTENDED INTRODUCTION
A. The Lemonade Stand
The sultriness that was summer in D.C. blanketed the pedestrians
returning to Capitol Hill. Trickling toward home through air that pas-
sively resisted, I almost overlooked a shape emerging from the haze of
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my own street. It might have been some atmospherically-induced appa-
rition; rather, there, in the 1990s, in front of a well-kept urban
rowhouse with door adorned by yuppie wreath, sat an immaculate child,
seraphically presiding over a linen-covered table bearing a pitcher made
of Tupperware. His neatly lettered sign, presumably prepared by an in-
visible caregiver in endorsement of his enterprise, read "Lemonade - 50
Cents."
The little boy with the pitcher became a fixture of late August.
Each business day, he held his post from four to six p.m. Although I
never patronized his stand, I watched others who did. He seemed quite
pleased as each quarter clinked into his pocket, and he never failed to
thank each customer and to suggest a repeat transaction.
There may be some romantic explanation for the young merchant's
dedication. He might, after all, have been contributing to a shortfall in
the family mortgage payment consequent to the recession that rippled
across the Washington legal community-in this scenario, the briefcases
and well-tailored suits sported by both his parents might just have been
a brave front. He might have been saving for a life-preserving operation
for a younger sister (who, to the best of my knowledge, did not exist).
Although I occasionally amused myself by speculating about his mo-
tives, I eventually concluded that I would really rather not know what
they were. As it is, he can remain to me an intriguing symbol.
One of the things the little boy symbolizes is good old American
enterprise. He saw a need and he filled it. Better yet, he created it: after
all, did people only yards from their own GE appliances really need
lemonade that, to all appearances, wasn't even sugar-free?
To any reasonably imaginative alumna of the first year of law
school, the little boy also embodies liability waiting to happen. Lemons
are produce-that means pesticides, doesn't it? Suppose there are seeds
in the lemonade, waiting to choke an unwary customer. And sugar
causes tooth decay. In the event the lemonade is sugar-free, what might
that mean? Can a few oversaturated test rats really be trfisted? Of
course people know about these risks when they consume lemonade,
but has that line of argument been quite the slam-dunk the tobacco
companies would have liked?
Today, the little boy, whom I will now call Todd, may have an in-
surance policy in the form of his chubby cheeks and adorable cowlick.
In our increasingly litigious society, however, I wouldn't count on it.
Besides, Todd is probably not going to be cute forever. If, when he was
counting the start-up capital in his Ninja Turtle bank, Todd had real-
ized that he was putting at risk his tricycle and college education, would
Capitol Hill have been minus one lemonade stand?
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B. The American Dream Meets Dr. Frankenstein
A significant part of the story of American enterprise has been
written by state legislators hoping to stimulate entrepreneurship and
investment.1 As a result, there are several forms of business organiza-
tions that at least ostensibly will permit an economic actor to limit the
amount that she puts at risk.2 The most popular of these forms is the
corporation.3
If it was ever true that limited liability was necessary to encourage
economic development,4 it is arguably even more necessary today. The
litigious society facetiously posited as a foil for young Todd does exist.5
Moreover, the statistics indicating the chance of success for any new
business are frightening: the majority of start-up enterprises fail,6 leav-
ing debts in excess of assets. Even traditional bastions of investment
security seem to be collapsing in record numbers. 7 Since these facts log-
ically compel a perception that the "upside" potential of entrepreneur-
ship and investment is limited, it may make sense to assure that
1. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation
Law, 19 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 466 (1931); Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspec-
tive, 19 Urban Law. 193 (1987); Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern Incorpora-
tion Statutes, 3 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 273, 278-79 (1937). Note that the statement in the text reflects
generally accepted wisdom, but probably overstates the deliberate nature of legislative action.
2. For a brief discussion of several forms, including the limited partnership, the real estate
investment trust, and the Massachusetts business trust, see Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations
Including Partnerships and Limited Partnerships 119 (West, 4th ed. 1990); Harry G. Henn and
John R. Alexander, Law of Corporations § 34 at 43-46 (West, 3d ed. 1983). For a discussion of the
ways in which the ideal of limited liability may fall short of the reality, see notes 82-84.
3. See Henn and Alexander, Law of Corporations § 1 at 2; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory
Developments in Business Corporation Law, 50 Rarv. L. Rev. 27, 29 (1936).
4. See notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
5. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983);
Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice and Court Reform: Examining the Crit-
ical Assumptions, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 319 (1985); Patricia M. Graham, Note, Sanctions Unwar-
ranted by Existing Law, 52 Brooklyn L. Rev. 609 (1986).
6. See David L. Biddulph, New Businesses: Profitable Prospects, Direct Marketing 44, 44-45
(April 1990) (stating that there is a 60% chante a new business venture will either exit or fail
within five years); Dana Parsons, Entrepreneurs Undaunted by Pitfalls of Hairy Business, L.A.
Times B1, col. 2 (Jan. 29, 1992) (stating that more than half of new businesses fail within five
years; one-third fail within one year); Cynthia Rigg, Lack of Curiosity Can Kill Fledgling Firms,
Crain's New York Business 17 (Jan. 27, 1992) (60% failure rate); Paul Schreiber, How One Start-
up Got Started, Newsday 25 (Feb. 10, 1992) (60% failure rate).
7. See, for example, Jerry Knight and Susan Schmidt, Brady: Bailout Possible if Bank Bill
Fails, Wash. Post C1 (June 18, 1991) (projecting an increase in the number of bank failures);
Stephen Labaton, House Panel Approves Sweeping New Bank Rules, N.Y. Times Sec. 1 p. 35
(June 29, 1991) (discussing bank failures). Contrast Christine Winter, Bank Profits Bounce to Bra-
zilian Beat, Chi. Trib. C1 (Jan. 22, 1989) (discussing instability in the financial condition of
banks).
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"downside" possibilities are limited as well.8
Limited liability, of course, cannot be regarded as an unmitigated
good. If it were, legislators presumably would have conferred it upon all
business forms long ago.9 As a more general matter, they now would
flock to endorse caps on tort recoveries.10 In fact, even brief retrospec-
tion reveals quite an interesting picture of the historically perceived
risks of limited liability.1 This historical perception may be described
in terms of a morality play featuring two important characters. One of
these characters is a hapless public, completely unaware that the smil-
ing individual handing out cups of lemonade is not personally and com-
pletely on the line for the contents of those cups.'2 The other is Dr.
Frankenstein. 3
8. These and related arguments are discussed in more detail at notes 281-85 and accompa-
nying text.
9. Note, however, the argument that, by restricting access to organizational forms that con-
fer limited liability on enterprise participants, state legislators enhance their ability to seek "rents"
from those desiring such limitations. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80, 91-92 (1991). Nevertheless, legislative interest in the limited liabil-
ity company is increasing. At least eight states have adopted statutes permitting the formation of
these entities, and several more have indicated some inclination to do so. See note 307; S. Brian
Farmer and Louis A. Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U. Richmond L.
Rev. 789, 790-91 (1991); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice
for Doing Business?, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 721, 739 (1989).
On a more theoretical level, it is important to recognize that when liability does not exist,
there is no need to limit it. To some extent, then, a primary legislative or judicial refusal to impose
liability for some particular activity may substitute for a secondary determination to limit the class
of individuals upon which such liability might otherwise be vicariously imposed. See notes 291-94
and accompanying text.
10. Fewer than 20 states have adopted some such cap. See, for example, Ala. Code § 41-9-70
(1975); Cal. Bus. & Prof. ,Code § 6164 (Deering 1991); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-114 (1990); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 768.28 (West 1991); Idaho Code § 6-926 (1990); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, 825 (Smith-Hurd
1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39 (West 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.04 (West 1991); Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 13-922, 13-926 (1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (1990); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 101.023 (Vernon 1991); Wisc. Stat. Ann. §§ 893.80, 893.82 (1991); Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-
118 (1991).
11. According to a May 25, 1824 editorial in the London Times:
Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a portion of their
excess for the information of a company, to play with that excess-to lend the importance of
their name and credit to the society and then should the funds prove insufficient to answer all
demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded fortune, and leave the bait to be
devoured by the poor deceived fish.
Similarly, J. K. McCollish, the first professor of political economy at the University of London
(1859) is quoted as saying, "[w]ere Parliament to set about devising means for the encouragement
of speculation, over-trading and swindling, what better could it do?" Aubrey L. Diamond, Corpo-
rate Personality and Limited Liability, in Tony Orhnial, ed., Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion 22, 42 (Croom Helm, 1983).
12. Legislative concern that the corporate format will mislead the public is apparent both in
the requirement that corporations make public filings and in the requirement that their names
give notice of their status. See, for example, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 2.01, 4.01.
13. See Mary W. Shelley, Frankenstein (Dodd, Mead, 1983) (novel depicting a scientist's
failure to control his own inhuman creation).
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According to this Frankensteinian view, irresponsible corporate im-
presarios regularly dispatch inhuman corporate entities to roam the
countryside in search of profits. Lacking both conscience 4 and capital,' 5
these entities will inflict injuries for which they cannot, and their heed-
less inventors need not, pay. In an uncharitable, but not necessarily un-
realistic, permutation, the corporate scientist quite deliberately may
design the creature to generate short-run gains for the creator, while
surreptitiously imposing tremendous costs on third parties."
During recent decades, a succession of extremely nonanthro-
pomorphic cost-benefit analyses have lulled these vivid images into
slumber.' 7 Nonetheless, ascription to the gothic corporate model once
again may be on the rise. For example, in the 1980 enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA),'18 Congress provided that "operators," as well as corpo-
rate waste-generators themselves are liable for environmental clean-up
costs.'9 Courts recently have interpreted this provision as an invitation
to impose liability on corporate parents for the pollutive defalcations of
actively managed subsidiaries.2 0 More generally, interest in meaningful
criminal sanctions for corporate acts has been increasing.2' In all likeli-
hood, some especially modern horror stories have prompted these de-
velopments and, in the public mind, given new life to the gothic view.
14. There is a substantial literature discussing how diffusion of responsibility among corpo-
rate decisionmakers has caused a general lack of corporate ethical conscience. See, for example,
Donald J. Miester, Jr., Comment, Criminal Liability for Corporations that Kill, 64 Tulane L. Rev.
919, 921 (1990); Paul H. Weaver, The Suicidal Corporation 182-93 (Simon and Schuster, 1988).
15. Minimum capital requirements were a usual feature of early corporate charters and ena-
bling statutes. See note 55 and accompanying text; Henn and Alexander, Law of Corporations §
126 at 295 (cited in note 2); Bruce E. Douglas, Note, Statutory Minimum Capitalization Require-
ments, 5 Willamette L. J. 331 (1969).
16. See Miester, 64 Tulane L. Rev. at 921; see also sources cited in note 126 (discussing the
importance of undercapitalization in determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil to
impose liability on corporate shareholders); Weaver, The Suicidal Corporation at 182-96 (cited in
note 14).
17. See Part II.C.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
19. Id. § 9607(a).
20. See, for example, United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990);
Cooper Development Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of Boston, 762 F. Supp. 1145 (D.N.J. 1991);
Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1991); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988). But see Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA did not impose direct liability on a parent corporation for
violations of its wholly owned subsidiary).
21. See Truxtun Hare, Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corporate
Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935 (1990); Jay C.
Magnuson and Gareth C. Leviton, Policy Considerations in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions Af-
ter People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (1987); Barbara H. Doerr,
Comment, Prosecuting Corporate Polluters: The Sparing Use of Criminal Sanctions, 62 U. De-
troit L. Rev. 659, 664-65 (1985).
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As Pintos explode22 and oil soaks the Alaskan coastline,23 passion once
again is beginning to infuse arguments that for an interim period had
become extremely dry.
C. Mary Shelley Was a Woman
The developments described above set the stage for a reevaluation
of limited liability. Such a reevaluation demands acknowledgment and
at least brief discussion of basic corporate principles and the prevalent
economic thinking with respect to those principles. This reevaluation
need not, however, merely rehash the primarily historical.
Recently popularized feminist philosophies provide fresh analytic
tools that may be applied to the question of limited liability. 24 These
philosophies provide entirely new organizing structures and con-
cepts-new perceptions of reality.25 These perceptions tend to reorder a
world in which, to date, the irresistible force of social need has done
battle with the immovable object of innate self-interest. 6
Most inquiries based on feminist methods have addressed areas far
afield from corporate law. These inquiries often have suggested that so-
ciety and its institutions have failed to respond to the basic needs of at
least a portion of humankind. Occasionally, descriptions of the lost
subjunctive-that which might have existed but demonstrably does
not-have had decidedly Marxist overtones.2s Competing perceptions of
reality notwithstanding, recent history appears to constrain the imme-
diate utility of this type of analysis. In the last two years, the western
22. See Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Anton v. Ford Motor
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Miester, 64 Tulane L. Rev. at 927 (cited in note 14).
23. See Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard
the Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l Law & Econ. 733,
763 n.220 (1990); Gary V. Perko, Note, Spillover from the Exxon Valdez: North Carolina's New
Offshore Oil Spill Statute, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1214 (1990). For further discussion of recent business
scandals see Patrick Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Com-
pliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 413, 415-17 (1991).
24. See Part IV.
25. See Part III.B.2.d.
26. Note that some aspects of this conflict already have been reconciled to the satisfaction of
many economists by the device of the invisible hand. Thus, commentators from Adam Smith, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 423 (Modern Library, E. Carman
ed. 1937), to Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 4, 14-15, 196-200 (U. Chi., 1962), have
argued that because each actor in the market is guided by the invisible hand of self-interest, the
society as a whole reaps the benefit of the greater sum of wealth produced. See also Alan Green-
span, Antitrust, in Ayn Rand, ed., Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 56 (New Amer. Lib., 1967);
Alan Greenspan, The Assault on Integrity, in Ayn Rand, ed., Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 112
(New Amer. Lib., 1967).
27. See Part III.B.1.
28. See notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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world has seen the virtual collapse of socialism as a dominant motivat-
ing ideology. 29 It therefore seems prudent to circumscribe reconstruc-
tive efforts by reference to practical human desires.30
The tasks of this Article, then, are as follows. The first is to briefly
describe the "official story" of limited liability. This description will en-
compass both basic corporate principles and related economic analysis.
The second task is to formulate practically circumscribed criticisms of
the official story premised on feminist assumptions and methods. The
Article's final endeavor is to bring what appear to be competing ana-
lytic strands into informative balance.
II. LOOKING BACK: FRANKENSTEIN'S CONTRACT
A. A Definition and Brief History of Limited Liability in America
The term "limited liability" typically describes a situation in which
one placing capital at the disposal of an enterprise risks loss of that
capital, but no more.3 1 In the context of the laws of business associa-
tions, the concept of limited liability distinguishes the posture of the
corporate shareholder 2 from that of the general partner or sole proprie-
tor.3 Discussions of this distinction frequently reflect a perception that
unlimited liability is the natural consequence of carrying on a business,
29. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, National Interest 1 (Summer
1989); Alan Riding, The New Europe of 1992 is Closer in Economics than in Politics, N.Y. Times
§ 5 at 2 (June 16, 1991); Nicolaus Mills, The Culture of Triumph and the Spirit of the Times, in
Nicolaus Mills, ed., Culture in an Age of Money 26-27 (I.R. Dee, 1990) (discussing Fukuyama's
essay); James Atlas, What is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom is He Saying It?, N.Y. Times § 6
at 38 (Oct. 22, 1989) (discussing Fukuyama's essay). But see Robin Blackburn, ed., After the Fall:
The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism (Verso, 1991) (broadly looking to a revi-
val of socialist energies).
30. In fact, since early legal commentators first took to cuneiform, most of their references to
"basic human needs," "practical desires," or the like necessarily have been matters of pure theory
or anecdote or both. As interdisciplinary adulterations to straightforward legal analysis become
increasingly acceptable, however, it may be possible to anchor discussion in at least some amount
of empiricism. There may, in other words, be at least piecemeal "scientific" responses to some
"legal" questions previously answered by assumption. For purposes of this Article, the foremost of
these questions would be whether humans are, indeed, so risk-averse that limited liability is neces-
sary to stimulate entrepreneurship and investment. For a nonempirical discussion along these
lines, see notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
31. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 90 (1985); Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 81 n.1 (cited in note 9).
32. See, for example, Henn and Alexander, Law of Corporations § 24 at 74 (cited in note 2);
Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 Yale L.
J. 1190, 1191 (1967).
33. The term also describes the position of the limited partner or investors in esoteric enti-
ties such as the limited liability company. See, for example, Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory
of Limited Partnership, 37 Emory L. J. 835, 841 (1988).
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and limited liability is a special benefit conferred in exchange for the
expense and constraints of the corporate format. 4
Like the corporate stockholder, the enterprise creditor-that is,
one who puts capital at the disposal of a business without receiving an
equity position 35-historically has enjoyed an assumed limit on expo-
sure to loss in excess of the initial investment.36 Indeed, most would
consider the possibility that a creditor might be liable for a borrower
enterprise's activity quite startling, and more than a little trouble-
some.37 Thus, limited liability is the popularly viewed natural state for
creditors, 38 regardless of the .type of business entity that receives the
credit.
As a historical matter, differences in the extent of liability attach-
ing to particular investment positions became distinct in the nineteenth
century. Commentators have described prior American thought on the
question of limited liability as "almost nonexistent."3 9 This inattention
is not altogether surprising, given, among other things, the relative in-
frequency of litigation during early American history"' and the original
strictness of privity requirements.41 The first corporate charters thus
34. See, for example, Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,
53 Va. L. Rev. 259, 262 (1967); Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 81 (cited in note 9) (discussing this
perception).
35. "Equity" has been defined as follows: "A stockholder['s] proportionate share (ownership
interest) in the corporation's capital stock and surplus. The extent of an ownership interest in a
venture." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
36. Compare Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 31), with Kerry
L. Macintosh, Am I My Borrower's Keeper?, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 1197, 1200-07 (1989) (discussing
traditional reasons why lenders or other suppliers are not held liable for a borrower's use of funds).
37. See, for example, Nill V. Toulme and Douglas E. Cloud, The Fleet Factors Case: A
Wrong Turn for Lender Liability Under Superfund, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 127 (1991); M. Joan
Cobb, Comment, Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders Under CERCLA Secured Credi-
tor Exemption Law, 40 Wash. U. J. Urban & Contemp. L. 249 (1991); Sean P. Madden, Comment,
Will the CERCLA be Unbroken? Repairing the Damage After Fleet Factors, 59 Fordham L. Rev.
135 (1990). See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 Yale L. J. 131
(1989); Troy H. Gott and William L. Townsley, III, Note, Lender Liability: A Survey of Theories,
Thoughts and Trends, 28 Washburn L. J. 238 (1988).
38. But see the authorities cited in note 37 (discussing recent developments in lender
liability).
39. See E. Merrick Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860 120, 369 (Harvard,
1954); Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J.
Econ. Hist. 1, 16-17 (1945). See also Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,
11 J. Corp. L. 573, 588 (1986) (discussing other sources). But see id. at 588 (discussing discrete
instances in which limited liability was granted in early charters). Corporate law, in general, was
virtually nonexistent in America before the 19th century. Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the
Earlier History of American Corporations 309 (Harvard, 1917); Samuel Williston, History of the
Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 (pt. 2), 2 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 165-66 (1888).
40. Compare Davis, History of American Corporations at 294 (unable to locate any example
of creditor loss from business failure in the two decades following the American Revolution).
41. See, for example, Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 401 (Exch. 1842); Alex
Devience, Jr., The Developing Line Between Warranty and Tort Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2 DePaul Bus. L. J. 295, 297 (1990); Coffin v.
1992] 1395
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were silent on the question of limited liability.4
2
When American 43  courts originally addressed the question of
whether liability incurred by a corporation should pass through to its
shareholders, they tended to focus on the separate juridical stature of
the corporation for purposes such as holding title." The judicial conclu-
sion, then, was that shareholders did possess limited liability.45 When
called upon to choose for themselves, however, early legislators often
indicated a different selection.46 In keeping with the popular suspicion
of the artificial corporate entity,47 a provision imposing unlimited liabil-
ity on shareholders became a usual feature of corporate charters
granted in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.48
Before much time had passed, however, a precursive version of the
states' "race to the bottom"49 evidently influenced legislative reversal
on the liability issue. ° Thus, by the mid-1800s, industrial lobbying cou-
Rich, 45 Me. 507 (1858) (refusing to hold shareholders liable to corporate creditors because of lack
of privity).
42. See Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 580 (cited in note 39).
43. For a discussion of the earlier British experience, see, for example, Blumberg, 11 J. Corp.
L. at 577-81, 585-87; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 Tulane L. Rev.
1143, 1155-60 (1989). For a discussion of the separate derivations of American and British corpo-
rate law, see L. C. B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1371-72 (1956).
44. See, for example, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (13 Pet. 1839); Morton J. Hor-
witz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 185
(1985).
45. See, for example, Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824); Spear v. Grant, 16
Mass. 9, 14 (1819); Nichols v. Thomas, 4 Mass. 232, 233-35 (1808); William P. Hackney and Tracey
G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 848 (1982).
Contrast Tippetts v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595, 597 (1808).
46. See, for example, Act of March 3, 1809, ch. 65, § 6, 1806-1809 Mass. Laws 464, 466; Dodd,
Corporations at 365, 374, 387 (cited in note 39); Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. 588, 591; Dennis S.
Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21 Ariz. St. L. J. 663,
664 (1989).
47. See Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 591; Karjala, 21 Ariz. St. L. J. at 664. Dodd details
numerous instances of early hostility to corporations. See Dodd, Corporations at 27 n.42, 56, 57
n.41, 105, 114, 208-09, 269-70, 274, 275 n.11, 277-89, 311-13, 319, 367, 390, 393-95, 403-07, 410, 414-
17, 422-26, 432, 435-37.
48. Dodd, Corporations at 374, 387; Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 591.
49. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564-77 (1933) (Brandeis dissenting); Wil-
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663 (1974);
Andrew G. T. Moore, II and Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 Cardozo L.
Rev. 779 (1987). See generally Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition
in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. Legal Stud. 129, 143-46 (1985). But see Daniel R.
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 (1982) (discussing the competition for corporate charters
from an economic perspective).
50. See Joseph Kinnicut Angell and Samuel Ames, Treatise on the Law of Private Corpora-
tions Aggregate 362 (Little Brown, 6th ed., 1832); Joseph G. Blandi, Maryland Business Corpora-
tions 1783-1852, 46, 55 (Johns Hopkins, 1934); Dodd, Corporations at 378-79 (cited in note 39);
Karjala, 21 Ariz. St. L. J. at 664 (cited in note 46); Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early
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pled with interstate competition for economic development prompted
many state legislatures to confer limitations on shareholder liability.51
This reversal was not universal52 and was not without debate;5 there is
no doubt that the gothic view of corporations still lived in the public
consciousness.2 Complicating the picture was the fear that corporations
might as easily possess too much economic viability as too little. Special
charters conferring limited liability and specifying both minimum and
maximum amounts of capital were thus quite common. 55
Displaying a mildly perplexing lack of gratitude for this legislative
largess, business entrepreneurs did not respond to the prospect of lim-
ited liability with an immediate rush to incorporate.5 6 This inertia may
have been a matter of economic happenstance 57 or a practical response
to the difficulty of the chartering process.58 Nonetheless, the rate of in-
corporation increased throughout the nineteenth century, as did the
rate of American industrialization. 9 Academics have summarized these
American Corporations, 43 J. Pol. Econ. 674, 677 (1935).
51. See Dodd, Corporations at 387-89 (cited in note 39) (discussing the trend in major north-
eastern industrial states); Mitchell, 63 Tulane L. Rev. at 1166 n.87 (cited in note 43) (all states but
California had adopted some limitation on shareholder liability by 1900).
52. In fact, pockets of shareholder liability continued to exist well into the 20th century. See,
for example, William L. Cary and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations
1130 (Foundation, 6th ed. 1988); Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 596-602 (cited in note 39); Horwitz,
88 W. Va. L. Rev. at 208 (cited in note 44).
53. See, for example, Dodd, Corporations at 380-81 (cited in note 39).
54. For a discussion of the opposition by Jacksonian Democrats to the principle of limited
liability, see Dodd, Corporations at 384-85; Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 595. See also note 47 and
accompanying text.
55. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 550 (Brandeis dissenting); James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy
of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970 at 27, 45, 51 (Univ. of
Va., 1970). This format also was adopted in the early acts of "general incorporation" or "self-
incorporation." See, for example, Act of June 10, 1837, Conn. Public Statute Laws, May 1836-May
1837 Sessions, c. 63, § 3 p. 49 (permitting self-incorporation for corporations with capital not more
than $200,000 or less than $4000); Act of May 15, 1851, Mass. Acts and Resolves 1839-99, c. 133,
§2, p. 633 (providing for self-incorporation of industrial companies with an authorized capital of
not more than $200,000 or less than $5,000); Act of July 7, 1866, New Hampshire Laws 1866, c.
4224, § 6, p. 3246-47 (providing for self-incorporation of manufacturing and other companies with
capital of not more than $300,000 or less than $5,000).
56. See Dodd, Corporations at 383 (noting only four such corporations in Massachusetts in
first year but steady increase in following few years); Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Com-
monwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-
1861, 162 (Belknap, rev. ed. 1969); Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 594.
57. Thus, general economic conditions may have influenced decisions to start new business
enterprises. See Stuart Bruchey, The Roots of American Economic Growth, 1607-1861, 139
(Harper & Row, 1968) (industrial techniques that required large amounts of capital were not de-
veloped until after 1835); compare Dodd, Corporations at 383 (cited in note 39) (for five years
after limited liability was adopted in Massachusetts, the rate of incorporation remained stable;
then, there was a large increase in incorporating activity in 1836 and 1837, followed by a sharp
decline, presumably due to economic depression).
58. Dodd, Corporations at 382-83.
59. Note too the development of general incorporation statutes. See generally id. at 390.
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developments as proof that a system of factory production can survive
under a regime of unlimited liability, but will grow faster with limited
liability.60
The foregoing conclusion and its subsumed assumptions as to the
desirability of industrial growth were wholeheartedly-almost glee-
fully-embraced at the beginning of the twentieth century. Distin-
guished men said, in public places and presumably with straight faces,
"in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single
discovery of modern times. . . . Even steam and electricity are far less
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be re-
duced to comparative impotence without it." 6' It was left to later, and
more cynical, commentators to remind us what some of the early legis-
lators feared: in modern terms, a "moral hazard" arises whenever one
group may capture the benefits of an enterprise without being wholly
responsible for its risks.6 2
B. A Little (Still Historical) Reinterpretation
The previous Section commenced with a claim that unlimited lia-
bility is the popularly perceived natural state for equity owners. 3 By
contrast, limited liability is seen as natural for creditors.6 4 The treat-
ment of corporate shareholders diverges from the natural state, presum-
ably for some reason.
Arguably the line dividing corporate shareholders" from other eq-
60. Id. at 436; see also id. at 290.
61. Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia University, 1911, quoted in William M.
Fletcher, 1 Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporation § 21 (1917). Similarly: "[Limited liability
is] by far the most effective legal invention ... made in the nineteenth century." Charles W. Eliot,
President, Harvard University, quoted in Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man
Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 L. & Contemp. Probs. 473 (1953).
62. See, for example, Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, and Stuart Turnbull, An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L. J. 117, 148 (1981). See also
note 360 and accompanying text.
63. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
64. In fact, in a world where liability attaches only after a plaintiff meets some burden of
proof and taps into a line of precedent reflecting fairly ritualized policy considerations, general
lack of liability may be seen as the natural state, and liability itself the exception.
More specifically, however, the line generally perceived between creditors and equity investors
may very well be a natural one, given common-law concepts developed apart from the laws of
business associations. In other words, since the law of agency requires an ability to control in order
to create the principal-agent relationship and the law of tort frequently calls for demonstrations of
culpability and causal relationships, a case-by-case determination of the enterprise liability of
creditors probably would exempt most traditional lenders from such liability. This state of affairs
is formalized in an assumption that is infrequently questioned. But see the authorities cited in
note 37 (discussing recent developments in lender liability). These observations are basically a
contraction of the arguments made below with respect to corporate shareholders. See notes 65-80
and accompanying text.
65. The argument in the text also would apply to limited partners.
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uity investors is just as natural as the one separating creditors from
equity investors and may exist for many of the same reasons. In this
light, the rule of limited shareholder liability could be described as pri-
marily a statement of legal economy: with this class of defendants,
plaintiffs typically need not waste their own, and the courts', time. Only
when special factors are present should the plaintiff seek, and will the
judiciary be willing, to pierce the corporate veil.
66
As some evidence of the "naturalness" thesis, courts had recog-
nized limited shareholder liability well before it was statutorily articu-
lated. 7 Even if this development were no more than a response to the
corporation's juridical stature, it is a logical response and therefore sig-
nificant.6 8 Perhaps more importantly, institutional constraints on share-
holders' formal ability to control corporate activity also support the
logic of limiting shareholder liability.
6 9
Thus, the basic concept of limited liability for those with limited
control seems to respond to some of the same basic equity notions that
are reflected in, say, substantive tort law.70 There, the liability-preced-
66. See David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 374-76
(1981) (listing 19 factors and describing two-prong test); G. Michael Epperson and Joan M. Canny,
The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calami/y: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liabil-
ity in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 612 (1988)
(describing two-prong test); notes 83 and 125-31.
67. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
68. Thus, given that legislatures created the corporation as a separate legal entity, a status
not enjoyed by the partnership, joint stock association and the like, limitation on the pass-through
of liability is hardly surprising. But see William Zebina Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 66
(Little, Brown & Co., 1927) (contending that the entity theory is inappropriate for close corpora-
tions); Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 577 (cited in note 39) (limited liability "arose in the wake of the
acceptance of the entity concept, but not as a necessary consequence"); Mitchell, 63 Tulane L.
Rev. at 1168 (cited in note 43) (same, at least as regards close corporations).
69. Early statutes requiring that corporations be managed by the board of directors were
interpreted to prohibit shareholders from making agreements about matters relating to corporate
management. See, for example, Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y.
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Despite some relaxation on this point, Galler v. Galler,
32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), there continues to be interest in the concept of "proper sub-
jects" for shareholder action. See, for example, Somers v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc., 5 Ill.
App.3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462 (1972); see also Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Share-
holder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 97 (1988). Another restraint on share-
holders' ability to participate in management is the statutory imposition of formal requirements on
enforceable voting trusts. For discussion of such requirements, see, for example, Lehrman v. Co-
hen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966); Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338
(1957); see also William K. S. Wang, Pooling Agreements Under the New California General Cor-
poration Law, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 1171 (1976).
Statutory restraints on a limited partner's assumption of a controlling role reflect similar con-
cerns. See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303, 6 U.L.A. 307-08 (1990); Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969).
70. The same general themes are echoed in the capacity requirements of contract and crimi-
nal law.
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ing requirements of culpability 1 and causation 72 indicate a profound
social queasiness"s about imposing legal responsibility on individuals
who may in any sense be thought "innocent" with respect to a particu-
lar occurrence. 4 The historical difficulties courts have experienced in
dealing with joint, concurrent, and supervening causation illustrate this
discomfort.75 In terms of nineteenth-century tort law, then, the idea
that numerous shareholders contributing capital each could be regarded
as "causing" some later corporate act, actually conceived and executed
by other human actors, is quite farfetched.
Given the law as we know it, only the rules of agency even arguably
could provide the bridge to shareholder liability.7 6 These rules stipulate,
however, that vicarious liability arises only when the agent is subject to
71. Strict liability, of course, does exist for some torts. For instance, strict liability for tres-
pass certainly preceded development of any substantial body of corporate law. William L. Prosser
and W. Page Keeton, Law of Torts § 6 at 30 (West, 5th ed. 1984). Although there was a period
when American courts were quite interested in imposing culpability requirements, id. § 75 at 535,
arguably in order to aid developing businesses, that period passed. Strict liability now exists in a
number of circumstances, including the very important area of product liability. Id. § 98 at 692-94.
It is thought, moreover, to be increasing in significance. Id. § 75 at 536-38. Nonetheless, strict
liability typically does not dispense with requirements that cause be shown. Id. § 79 at 560.
72. Compare Leon Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 132 (Vernon, 1927) (stating that
"[c]ausal relation is the universal factor common to all legal liability"), with Stephen Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accident Law 109 (Harvard, 1987) ("A basic feature of all legal systems is that a
party's behavior must have been what has here been.called a necessary cause of an accident for
liability to be found."). Courts do, of course, from time to time vary the rigor of the required
demonstration of factual causation. The plaintiff usually must introduce evidence from which rea-
sonable persons might conclude that it is more probable than not that the defendant's conduct
caused the injury in question. See, for example, Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176
F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1949); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122, 123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
For some purposes, a certain level of statistical correlation between two occurrences may suffice to
sustain liability unless the defendant disproves cause. See, for example, McCormack v. Abbott
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1524 (D. Mass. 1985); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, 930 (1980). Contrast Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 246,
505 A.2d 973, 985 (1985). See generally Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 916 (1980); Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978).
73. But see the arguments made by legal economists discussed in text accompanying notes
88-94.
74. Conversely, to the extent a person's ability to direct an action, enjoy its benefit, and still
remain free of liability seems unfair, the imposition of restrictions on control to avoid this result is
not surprising. See the authorities cited in note 69.
75. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 88-97 (1956);
Paul J. Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31
DePaul L. Rev. 769, 803 (1982).
76. The statement in the text contemplates imposition of vicarious liability; nevertheless, it
is also possible that some sort of direct liability might arise for fault in selection or supervision of
an agent, see Restatement of the Law of Agency § 213 (1933) (indicating that such direct liability
exists), although demonstration of the agency relationship would encounter the same difficulties
discussed in note 79.
1992] LEMONADE STAND 1401
control by,77 and acts for the intended benefit of, the principal.7 To the
extent that corporate law restricts the matters to which shareholders
may speak, the first of these requirements is problematic. To the extent
that the corporate format contemplates group ownership, both require-
ments present difficulties that are simultaneously theoretical and real. 9
As a result, even without formal limitations, it is unlikely that courts
would impose pass-through liability on the owners of publicly held
corporations."0
In the case of closely held corporations, shareholders do possess the
actual ability to control. Together with the relatively modern develop-
ment of close corporation statutes that permit such control to be exer-
cised quite directly,"' this may be evidence that a "naturalness" thesis
77. The requisite is a right to control rather than actual control. Section one of the Restate-
ment provides that "[a]gency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act." Restatement of the Law of Agency §1.
78. The usual articulation of this requirement is that the agent must act "on behalf of" the
principal. Id. See Robert A. Koenig, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee:
Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1986); Kenneth M.
Koprowicz, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for En-
forcing Workplace Safety?, 52 Brooklyn L. Rev. 183, 187 n.16 (1986).
79. Thus, short of group unanimity, minority interests will be unable to control putative
agents. Similarly, a particular act by a putative agent may represent a benefit to some and a dis-
tinct detriment to others. These same theoretical difficulties are, of course, tolerated in the context
of general partnerships. Note, however, that as a formal matter, it is co-ownership rather than
control that is the requisite for partnership liability. See generally Allen R. Bromberg and Larry E.
Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership §§ 2.07 (d)-(e) at 67-73 (Little, Brown, 1988).
According to Ribstein, "control may be more important in determining agency than in determining
partnership because of the various partnership indicia of monitoring status other than control,
which are not typically present in agency cases. Thus, 'continuous subjection to the will of the
principal' is necessary for agency, while a mere right to be consulted may be enough for partner-
ship." Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 97 n.68 (cited in note 9) (citations omitted).
Note, however, the modern attempt to establish that partnerships are themselves entities
rather than mere aggregates. See Hamilton, Corporations at 55-66 (cited in note 2). Moreover, to
the extent that the corporate format invites participation by large groups, the amount of individ-
ual control and the likelihood of mutuality of interest among corporate shareholders are substan-
tially diminished.
80. See Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 94 n.57 (cited in note 9). See generally Robert Hessen, In
Defense of the Corporation (Hoover Institution, 1979). Holders of widely dispersed shares simply
lack both the formal and real ability to control either the entity or its agents and therefore cannot
themselves be considered principals.
81. See, for example, Ala. Code § 10-2A-308 (1975); Cal. Corp. Code § 300 (West 1990); 8 Del.
Code Ann. § 351 (1983); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, 2A.45 (Smith-Hurd 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-
7211 (1981); 13-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 407(5) (West 1981); Md. Corps. and Ass'ns. Code Ann. § 4-
401 (Supp. 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.591 (Baldwin 1985); 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2332 (West
1992); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 12.37(B) (Vernon 1982). These statutes simply may be reac-
tions to the formalism that already permitted shareholders to act as corporate directors and agents
without imperiling the limited liability attached to their shareholder status. See Kelvin H. Dickin-
son, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partner-
ship, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 559, 565-66 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 Stan L. Rev. 271, 273 (1986); Mitchell, 63 Tulane L. Rev. at
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is incomplete. Corporate texts commonly observe, however, that limited
liability is not of particular consequence for the very closely held corpo-
ration, given the likelihood that voluntary creditors will ask for per-
sonal guarantees and that shareholders, acting as corporate agents, will
already be liable for their own torts.2 In addition, "piercing the corpo-
rate veil" to impose corporate liability is most likely in the close corpo-
ration context.8 3 As a practical matter, then, those with significant
actual control frequently will endure liability that is substantially
coterminous s4
The important point to be made, however, is that limited liability
for corporate shareholders is no particular sore thumb on the hand of
American law. Criticisms of limited liability thus extend to other fea-
tures of the law that reflect the same themes, and vice versa. A related
point is that the hazards presented by limited shareholder liability are
not dramatically different from those presented by limited creditor lia-
bility, or from those imposed by the practical reality that the individu-
als who back sole proprietorships or partnerships may be unable to
make good on the debts incurred by their business enterprises. None-
theless, naturalness, in terms of nonaberration, does not necessarily
translate into moral correctness or permanent desirability. This theme
will be revisited in some depth in Part III.
C. Economic Perspectives: The Convincing, the Credible, and the
Strained
Since the 1970s, economic analysis has held the academic playing
field in the area of corporate law. 5 This school has, of course, had its
1151 (cited in note 43).
82. See, for example, Hamilton, Corporations at 120 (cited in note 2). The textual reference
to the shareholder's "own" torts would include direct liability for negligent selection or supervision
of subagents.
83. Robert R. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L.
Rev. 1036 , 1047, 1054-55 (1991). In fact, there seem to be no known instances in which the corpo-
rate veil of a publicly held corporation has been pierced to impose liability on individual share-
holders. Id. at 1047. But see Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of
Multinational Corporations, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 283, 289 n.11 (1990) (discussing a possible excep-
tion). Note also that close corporation statutes offset the threat of veil-piercing by relaxing the
requirements for certain corporate formalities. See generally William K. S. Wang, The California
Statutory Close Corporation: Gateway to Flexibility or Trap for the Unwary?, 15 San Diego L.
Rev. 687 (1978); Hugh G. Martin, Comment, Corporations-Close Corporations-Strictness of Re-
quirements at Meetings of Shareholders and Directors, 14 S.C. L. Q. 408 (1962).
84. There are exceptions; for instance, shareholders of a close corporation may succeed in
avoiding liability to small trade creditors and employees. See Hamilton, Corporations at 121 (cited
in note 2). Note that the statement in the text is close to the simplifying assumption made by
economists as discussed and criticized in notes 132-34, 150-51 and accompanying text.
85. For a sample of the influential economic literature addressing various aspects of the cor-
poration, see Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
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critics,86 and some free spirits have managed to stay out of its vortex
entirely. Nonetheless, the economists' vocabulary of "risk-bearing,"
"risk-shifting," and "nexus of contracts" has dominated the literature.8 7
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the general approach
of the law-and-economics movement is itself a type of naturalness the-
sis. The movement frequently attempts to demonstrate that long-lived
legal constructs can be explained primarily as tending toward economic
efficiency.'8 To the extent that the starting premise of a tendency to-
ward efficiency is correct, one should observe inescapable commonality
throughout the law.
In the view of most law-and-economics scholars, a result is "effi-
cient" if those benefited gain more than those detrimented lose.89 Bene-
fit is assessed in terms of "willingness to pay," basically by postulating
a model of pre-act bargaining.90 The efficiency analysis is unaffected,
nomic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature
of the Firm, 26 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1983); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386
(1937); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965); Manne, 53 Va. L. Rev.
at 259 (cited in note 34).
86. For criticism of the view that an individual's preferences are best for him or her, see
Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769. See also Robin West, Authority, Auton-
omy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 384 (1985); Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation". Law, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (discussing transaction costs).
87. See, for example, Nicholas Wolfson, The Modern Corporation: Free Markets Versus
Regulation (Free Press, 1984); Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. Butler, Antitakeover Amend-
ments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 Va. L. Rev.
1257 (1985); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 Geo. Mason U. L.
Rev. 99 (Summer 1989); Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the
Corporation, 55 Brooklyn L. Rev. 767 (1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Move-
ment, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 (1982).
88. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text. See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law 229-45 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1986); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977).
89. See William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 16
(Harvard, 1987).
90. See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis at 7-15 (cited in note 88). The proponents
of this method recognize that in many cases advance negotiation is not feasible. Id. See generally
id. ch. 13.4 at 351 (discussing the merits of ex ante vs. ex post control in such circumstances). For
criticism of the elimination from the efficiency calculation of nonmonetary factors, see generally
Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux, Humanistic Economics: The New Challenge (Bootstrap, 1988);
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980) (challenging wealth max-
imization as a social value); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Princi-
ple, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980) (attacking the normative principle of wealth maximization); Frank
A. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev.
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however, by whether or not actual compensation moves from the bene-
fited to the detrimented; it is societal, not individual, wealth maximiza-
tion that is sought.9 1 Although this school acknowledges that society
may wish to forsake efficiency 92 in favor of wealth distribution con-
cerns,93 it regards these concerns as outside the parameters of its own
inquiry. 4 The excesses of the strict economic approach toward this di-
chotomy have been sternly criticized,95 as has the narrow economic defi-
nition of benefit.96
In the context of limited liability for corporate shareholders, pre-
vailing economic theory has produced a number of interesting argu-
ments.97 Even staunch critics would find some of these arguments
intuitively convincing, if not desirable, in terms of underlying value
judgments.98 Another category of economic arguments about limited
shareholder liability includes those that are credible, but subject to log-
ical debate. In addition, there exists a third class of economic argument
on the subject that one frankly doubts the proponents themselves could
believe. Examples of all three categories are set out below.
307 (1979) (arguing that wealth maximization is a principle biased in favor of the wealthy); West,
99 Harv. L. Rev. at 384 (cited in note 86) (saying that Posnerian wealth maximization leads to
tragic lives of humiliation and alienation).
91. An efficient result in this sense is distinct from one that is Pareto-preferred. Landes and
Posner, Economic Structure at 16 (cited in note 89). A result is Pareto-preferred if no one can be
made better off without making someone else worse off. Id. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 7 n.4 (Little, Brown, 1983).
92. Polinsky, Law and Economics at 105-13.
93. According to Polinsky, "[e]fficiency corresponds to 'the size of the pie,' while equity has
to do with how it is sliced." Id. at 7.
94. Thus, according to Polinsky, "[e]conomists traditionally concentrate on how to maximize
the size of the pie, leaving to others-such as legislators-the decision how to divide it." Id. at 7.
95. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship,
Sophistry or Self-Indulgence?, LXVIII Proc. Brit. Acad. 1 (1982).
96. See, for example, Lutz and Lux, Humanistic Economics (cited in note 90); Dworkin, 9 J.
Legal Stud. at 191 (cited in note 90); Kronman, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 227 (cited in note 90). Obvi-
ously, those who disagree with the law-and-economics school on these or related matters will find
many of its findings to be of dubious utility.
97. See, for example, Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation at 17-18 (cited in note 80);
Posner, Economic Analysis at 269-72 (cited in note 88); Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 615-16 (cited
in note 39); Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 89 (cited in note 31); Halpern, Trebil-
cock, and Turnbull, 30 U. Toronto L. J. at 144 (cited in note 62); Manne, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 262-63
(cited in note 34); Susan Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. Institu-
tional & Theoretical Econ. 601, 602-06 (1985).
98. For a critical assessment of the value judgments made by the law-and-economics move-
ment see, for example, Lutz and Lux, Humanistic Economics (cited in note 90); Michelman, 46 U.




1. With an Air of Conviction
For purposes of this subsection, three lines of argument will suffice
to exemplify the most intuitively convincing category of economic anal-
ysis." The first concerns the effect of limited liability on development
of an active trading market. Economic commentators have noted that,
as a matter of common sense, investors made fully liable for the debts
of the enterprises in which they invest could not sensibly choose to in-
vest in more than a few entities.100 Moreover, because variance in per-
sonal wealth would result in variance in the risk associated with a
particular investment, investors with different amounts of wealth would
tend to place different values on the same shares (with the ironic result
that "high-risk" shares would be worth more to those with less
wealth). 10 1 This variance in share valuation would reduce the ease and
availability of market transactions. °10 Accordingly, limiting shareholder
liability is one way to facilitate the development and continuation of
active securities markets.10 3
Also intuitively attractive is the economists' observation that share-
holders with limited liability will be less intent on monitoring the per-
formance of corporate managers than otherwise would be the case. 0 4 In
99. In evaluating these arguments, it is important to observe that, in their simplest forms,
they are convincing because they reflect commonly shared assumptions about attitudes toward
risk. They differ from the other, less convincing forms of economic argument, which typically make
more specialized assumptions about human motivations and behavior.
100. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 31);
Manne, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 262 (cited in note 34). As posited by my colleague, Larry Mitchell, when
the entities involved are extremely large and shareholder participations quite small, this analysis
might break down. The debts incurred by General Motors, for example, would have to be immense
before any shareholder would incur more than a few cents of obligation per share under a pro rata
liability regime. As a practical matter, small investors probably also would have little to fear under
a joint and several regime.
101. See, for example, Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, 30 U. Toronto L. J. at 130 (cited
in note 62).
102. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 92; Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, 30
U. Toronto L. Rev. at 130-31. Note that buyers and sellers who place the same value on shares
presumably could find one another; to do so, however, would require additional cost and effort. See
also Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Cor-
porate Torts, 100 Yale L. J. 1879, 1904-05 (1991) (arguing that the market effects described in the
text could be reduced by adopting a rule of pro rata, rather than joint and several, shareholder
liability).
103. Some economists suggest that there may be methods of abolishing limited liability with-
out completely destroying the capital markets. In particular, Hansmann and Kraakman have ar-
gued that although significant legal restructuring would be required, an active market could co-
exist with unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100
Yale L. J. at 1879.
104. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 94-95 (cited in note 31). Limited liability
also may reduce the costs of monitoring other shareholders to assure that they maintain enough
wealth to bear their fair share of pass-through liability. See id. at 95; Halpern, Trebilcock, and
Turnbull, 30 U. Toronto L. J. at 130, 136 (cited in note 62). But see note 100 (discussing role of
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the economic mind, however, this argument interacts with the last: at
the same time that limited liability reduces a shareholder's motivation
to act as management's overseer, it permits development of an active
securities market that facilitates a different kind of superintendence.
This marketplace supervision is said to take the spectral form of a
ccnstant threat of management-ousting takeovers launched by potential
acquirers that identify a shortfall between present market price and the
price that would prevail under superior management.105 Law-and-eco-
nomics scholars regard monitoring by potential acquirers as more effec-
tive and less duplicative than that forthcoming from "ordinary"
investors, and thus, from a societal standpoint, as wealth maximizing.0 6
The argument complements itself once more with the recognition that
because those who could hope to acquire control of an entity typically
will be wealthier than "ordinary" investors, limited liability assures that
potential acquirers attach a theoretically sufficient control premium to
their share valuation to pose a credible threat to present
management.
07
A third argument is similar to the second in that it is logically, if
not morally, compelling so long as kept modest. This argument main-
tains that a limitation on investors' liability permits management to un-
dertake higher-risk ventures than otherwise would be the case. At a
simple level, this means that to the extent shareholders pay attention to
what management is doing,'0 8 they may acquiesce in strategies entailing
a high risk of loss of their initial investment in exchange for a relatively
low probability of a return that is sufficiently huge.10 9 Were sharehold-
size of enterprise).
105. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 395 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 Yale L. J. 698 (1982); Manne, Market for Control (cited in note 34).
106. See the authorities cited in note 105; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161
(1981); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
107. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 96 (cited in note 31). Somewhere in the
coils of this self-embellishment the original conviction of the "ordinary" reader may begin to fade.
These elaborations thus may fall in the category discussed in Part II.C.2.
108. This monitoring might be accomplished by the shareholders acting on their own behalf
or, according to the economists, through the proxy of the efficient market. Research into the effi-
ciency of American capital markets in allocating information typically takes one of three forms.
"Weak form" tests measure whether the market fully reflects historical price data. "Semi-strong
form" tests study whether all publicly available information is reflected. "Strong form" tests study
whether both public and nonpublic information is reflected. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 388 (1970) (Session Topic:
Stock Market Price Behavior).
109. Thus, the prospect of finding gold at the bottom of a mine shaft might justify paying
the likely succession of claims by injured miners. Presumably, so long as the product of the
probability of loss multiplied by the amount of the possible loss is less than the product of the
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ers' entire personal fortunes at risk, this calculation would change, and
management would have to behave more conservatively.
As part of the high-tech economic model, however, the basic argu-
ment supposes that once shareholders possess the limited liability that
permits diversification, they logically will choose to diversify their non-
systemic investment risk.110 This diversification will encourage manage-
ment to engage in high-risk strategies, which, when coming croppers,
will be offset by the successful high-risk strategy decisions made by
managers in other industries. Economists regard this result as socially
beneficial in that high-risk strategies may produce significant techno-
logical and other innovations."'
2. Risk-Shifting and the Nexus of Contract: Finding What You Seek
Less intuitively accessible is a body of economic analysis based pri-
marily on the economists' own version of the "naturalness" thesis and
its underlying assumptions. As indicated above, economists presuppose
that resilient legal constructs more or less uniformly reflect movement
toward efficiency and that efficiency more or less is a matter of real or
hypothetical pre-act negotiation." 2 It is then a short step to the argu-
ment that the legal construct of limited liability for shareholders dupli-
cates, at a lower transaction cost, the contract that shareholders would
enter if permitted or required to bargain with third parties before-
hand.' 3 It is mildly surprising that this and related arguments could be
promoted as anything other than restatement of basic premises." 4
probability of gain multiplied by the amount of the possible gain, a person would be acting ration-
ally in choosing to invest.
110. For a succinct discussion of portfolio theory, see John H. Langbein and Richard A. Pos-
ner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72, 77-83 (1980). For indications
that portfolio diversification is the only rational investment strategy for the risk-averse individual
investor, see Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 857, 879 (1983); Easterbrook and Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale
L. J. at 712-13 (cited in note 105). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 748-49 (1984) (discussing why inves-
tors may choose to hold undiversified portfolios). From the viewpoint of the individual, the mod-
ern trend toward increased use of institutional surrogates seems to support the proposition that
investors will diversify their investments. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and
Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 13 (1991) (stating that
the concept of institutional prudence has been "recharacterized in recent years as a diversification
imperative").
111. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 97 (cited in note 31).
For discussion of management's innate tendency toward risk aversion, see, for example, Eugene F.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980).
112. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
113. See Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky, and Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of
Limited Liability, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 351, 364 (1979); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert D. Tol-
lison, Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 715 (1980).
114. The attempted proof of underlying assumptions consists of a chain of possible justifica-
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As the restatement goes, the risk of a particular investment is al-
ways reflected in its price. 115 Since the presence or absence of limited
shareholder liability affects the risk of a given investment, it will also
affect market price. Accordingly, although the choice of liability rule
may not seriously affect the likelihood of profitable investmenit out-
comes as far as equity investors themselves are concerned, it will either
shrink or expand "the pool of funds available for investment in projects
that would subject investors to risk.""' In other words, risky invest-
ments will attract less capital investment under a rule of unlimited lia-
bility. So far, so good: this reasoning is not vastly different from the
intuitively appealing argument acknowledged in Part II.C.1.
Limited liability, then, expands the pool of funds available for
risky investments. This presumably means that more risks will be
taken. Limiting shareholders' liability, however, does not make risks
evaporate; it simply makes sure they do not fall on shareholders. Thus,
one of the economists' main points seems to be that those voluntarily
doing business with a corporation are willing to accept this residual
risk. We know this because, under the current law, they do accept it
whenever they do not affirmatively seek shareholder guarantees or the
posting of some other security."'
As rational economic actors, voluntary corporate creditors are then
assumed to extract a price concession-higher interest rates for lenders,
lower product prices for consumers-in exchange for the increased risk
imposed on them by limited liability for shareholders." 8 Naturally, the
tions backing up from a conclusion that is taken as a given. See the text immediately below. Com-
pare Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 815, 822-23 (1990)
(stating that very little writing on law and economics could be described as a rigorous attempt to
falsify alternative explanations for a given phenomenon; the more usual approach is to provide
anecdotal data supporting the thesis). This is not, however, necessarily the case in all economic
analysis.
115. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 97 n.13 (cited in note 31),
this is the clear implication of the Coase Theorem. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Note the argument that, given a general rule of limited
liability for shareholders, market price reflects additional information about value and risk. This is
because limited liability facilitates the development of one "fair" price. See Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 96; James Hirsh Lorie and Mary Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories
and Evidence (Irwin-Dorsey, 1973); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securi-
ties Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson
and Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
116. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 97. One of the mechanisms giving rise to
this phenomenon is said to be that limited liability permits risk diversification. Id. at 96.
117. Compare id. at 105.
118. Id. Transactions allocating risks in this manner presumably take place because someone
is benefiting; otherwise they would waste time and impose needless transaction costs. But see
Ekelund and Tollison, 11 Bell. J. Econ. at 715 (cited in note 113) (arguing that the benefit to
stockholders of limited liability is exactly offset by the detriment to creditors); Meiners, Mofsky,
and Tollison, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. at 351 (cited in note 113) (arguing that the benefit to stockholders
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price that shareholders are willing to pay for limited liability must at
least equal the minimum that creditors would be willing to accept.
Thus, the monetary value to shareholders of what they are receiving
must at least equal the cost to creditors of what they are surrendering.
An excess of value over cost, and thus social wealth maximization, can
arise if creditors are better than shareholders at minimizing, bearing, or
at least tolerating risk, and thus willing to accept less than the maxi-
mum that shareholders would be willing to pay for the transfer.119
Economists give a number of reasons why allocating risks to credi-
tors does, in fact, maximize social wealth. 120 One of these is the argu-
ment that because order preferences in the event of liquidation mean
that equity investors will lose their investment before creditors, it is
more important to equity investors to monitor managers. 12 Thus, lim-
ited liability should reduce equity investors' attempts to monitor by
more than creditors' efforts are expected to increase.' 2' This does not,
of course, translate into more or better monitoring; it suggests instead
that there will be less monitoring, but that the saved cost is a social
benefit.123 A more reassuring argument is that institutional creditors,
who presumably comprise a smaller group than diversified investors,
will be more able monitors and less subject to the costs and disincen-
tives of coordinating monitoring activity."4
Some scholars extrapolate from these and related arguments in an
attempt to explain judicial willingness to pierce the corporate veil in
exceptional cases. 125 For instance, the factor of undercapitalization,
often mentioned by courts on their way to piercing a veil,"26 assumes
economic significance as a type of unusual capitalization that should be
of limited liability is exactly offset by the detriment to creditors).
Consider also the argument that these transactions simply might reflect innate disparities in
attraction or aversion to risk. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corpo-
rations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 507-08 (1976) (creditors may be less risk-averse than shareholders
or may have better information).
119. Compare Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 98 (cited in note 31).
120. See, for example, Posner, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 499 (cited in note 118); Easterbrook and
Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 91.
121. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 99.
122. Id.
123. Presumably, the specter of takeovers provides all the effective monitoring that is
needed, see notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
124. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 100 (cited in note 31);
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L. J. 49,
55-59, 68-73 (1982).
125. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 109-13.
126. See William 0. Douglas and Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Sub-
sidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 193, 210-11 (1929); Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
at 113; Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1065-67 (cited in note 83). This argument may fail, how-
ever, if the investors involved are institutional.
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revealed to creditors to spare the waste of a full credit investigation in
the case of small transactions. 27 Similarly, economists explain the
traditional veil-piercing inquiry into whether a corporation perpetrated
any fraud or misrepresentation in the course of obtaining credit 128 in
terms of a distorted portrayal of risk.129 Obviously if such distortions
were protected, creditors would have to guard against them with waste-
ful increases in investigation or a demand for additional price conces-
sions from the corporate debtor. Finally, the veil-piercing importance of
a corporation's status as closely, rather than publicly, held 30 is ex-
plained by the lack of an active securities market to perform the moni-
toring function that limited liability both permits and demands. 131
3. How People Who Ride in Taxis Get What They Deserve
Most forms of legal commentary attempt to explain why a particu-
lar legal result either has occurred or should be reached in the future. 3
2
When such an exercise demands reconciliation of the real world with a
particular Grand Theory, a funny thing happens to the real world. Lit-
tle pieces of it start, quite innocently, to disappear. Variances from the
Grand Theory are dismissed as aberrational or insignificant-in tradi-
tional legal analysis, "but see" usually does the trick. 33
The law-and-economics movement may not be any more guilty of
this "real world simplification phenomenon" than any other school.
Nonetheless, the simplifying assumptions made by legal economists are
textual-in fact, definitional-rather than by way of footnote, and can-
127. A parallel argument can be made with respect to the foreseeability doctrine in measur-
ing contract damages. See generally Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Indus-
trialization of the Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 249, 282-83 (1975).
128. See Cathy S. Krendl and James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the
Inquiry, 55 Denver L. J. 1, 31-34 (1978).
129. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 112; Posner, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
520-24 (cited in note 118).
130. See Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1047, 1054-55.
131. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 109-10.
132. Adherents of the critical legal studies and critical race studies movements are, of course,
notable exceptions. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,
28 Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in David
Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 281 (Pantheon, 1982); Critical Legal
Studies Symposium 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 6 Cardozo L.
Rev. 691 (1985); Allan C. Hutchinson, Introduction, in Allan C. Hutchinson, ed., Critical Legal
Studies (Rowman & Littlefield, 1985); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Le-
gal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 1043 (1988); Comment, The
Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a Heavy-
weight?, 11 B.C. Third World L. J. 137 (1991).
133. According to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 23 (Harvard L. Rev., 15th
ed. 1991), "but see" indicates that the cited authority clearly supports a proposition contrary to
the main proposition, "contra" indicates that the authority directly states the contrary, and "but
cf." signals authority supporting a proposition analogous to the contrary. Id.
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not help but attract controversy.134 In the context of limited liability, it
is some of these definitional assumptions that ring most hollow.
Recall, once again, the economists' conclusion that a rule of limited
liability for shareholders simply duplicates, at a lower cost, the agree-
ment that shareholders would reach with voluntary creditors.13 5 The
larger the group of voluntary creditors, then, the greater the explana-
tory power of the model. In this light, involuntary creditors-those
troublesome individuals who allow themselves to be squashed on the
public thoroughfare, asphyxiated in their beds by chemical spills, or
whatever-could constitute a real flaw on the face of Grand Theory.
For purposes of this Article, one of the most troubling practices of
economic analysis is the classification of many corporate creditors as
"voluntary" rather than "involuntary." To some law-and-economics
commentators, a voluntary creditor is anyone who was not hit from be-
hind by one of the corporation's trucks (an exaggeration, but not a big
one). 13 The range of voluntary creditors thus includes, along with
traditional institutional lenders and bondholders, such classes as sup-
pliers, customers, and employees (except maybe those hit from behind
by a truck on their day off).137
In terms of economic theory, then, consumers who are injured by
an insolvent corporation's defective products hypothetically have bar-
gained in advance for price concessions to reflect the possibility that
both injury and insolvency would occur.'38 Taxi cab passengers, injured
by a driver's negligence, supposedly made a similar bargain.' 39 Employ-
ees of corporations, cannily contemplating the possibility of corporate
bankruptcy prior to payment of wages in arrears, hypothetically de-
134. See notes 86 and 90.
135. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
136. But see Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1120-21 (cited in note 102) These
authors suggest distinguishing voluntary and involuntary creditors according to whether a given
victim reasonably can be understood to have contracted with the firm in substantial awareness of
the relevant risks of injury.
137. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 104 (cited in note 31)
(stating that "[e]mployees, consumers, trade creditors, and lenders are voluntary creditors," and
that "[t]he compensation they demand will be a function of the risk they face"). The greatest
concession to reality is made by those scholars who are willing to label these groups "quasi-volun-
tary" rather than "voluntary;" the analysis, however, seems to remain the same. See, for example,
Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 129-30 (cited in note 9).
138. See, for example, Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 129-30 (cited in note 9). Professor Ribstein
seems to concede that such bargaining is hypothetical, although normatively desirable.
139. The interest in taxi cab hypotheticas is, of course, attributable to the influence of
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966), a standard feature of most corporate
texts, involving an unsuccessful attempt to pierce the corporate veils between a shareholder and
several sibling corporate entities. See, for example, Hamilton, Corporations at 267 (cited in note
2). Observe, however, that the victim in Walkovsky was a pedestrian rather than a passenger.
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manded higher wages than they would have required had they gone to
work for partnerships.140
To some extent, this approach is reminiscent of one of the more
spectacularly non-Disney versions of the Cinderella story-the one in
which the stepsister cuts off her own big toe and stands in pain pro-
claiming the glass slipper's perfect fit.'4 ' Once the toe is gone, however,
this technique does leave a relatively small blemish on prevailing the-
ory. There are at least three ways to deal with the remaining flaw.
One method is simply to admit, typically as something of an aside
in an article largely emphasizing the importance of limited liability,
that the blemish of the involuntary creditor exists and may merit crea-
tion of some exceptions to the general rule. 142 Another is to minimize
the importance of this flaw by assuming that most corporations will
carry liability insurance, evidently at the instance of corporate manag-
ers who are insuring their own jobs against corporate insolvency. 143 The
third method is to argue that because the social benefits of limited lia-
bility for shareholders are so substantial, parties in their "original posi-
tion"-that is, not knowing if they ever will be involuntary
creditors-might very well favor a rule of limited liability.144 Because
the gamble of those who ultimately do become involuntary creditors
was a willing one, any blemish on the theory completely disappears.
45
140. Note that the approach developed by Hansmann and Kraakman, discussed in notes 103
and 136, would not assist employees or other groups who lack bargaining power rather than infor-
mation. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1879 (cited in note 102). Note also the stat-
utes adopted in a few states that impose personal liability on some shareholders for the wage
obligations of their corporations. See, for example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630 (McKinney 1992)
(imposing liability on the corporation's 10 largest shareholders).
141. See Jakob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Grimm's Fairy Tales 172-73 (Golden, 1986)
(translated by E.V. Lucas, Lucy Crane, and Marian Edwards).
142. See, for example, Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, 30 U. Toronto L. J. at 145-47
(cited in note 62). Observe, however, the attention devoted by Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull,
to other flaws in the economic model. For notable exceptions to the "brief aside" approach, see
Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1879; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1565 (1991). The Leebron piece became available after
completion of this Article and otherwise would merit more substantial discussion and citation.
143. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 107-09 (cited in note 31). This second
approach, like the first, more-or-less gracefully admits that the theory is not perfect. Id. at 107.
144. See, for example, Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 128 n.212 (cited in note 9). Note, however,
that Professor Ribstein does not seem to regard this argument as compelling. Id. at 128-29. The
"original position" is a centerpiece of John Rawls' philosophical theory of justice. See John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice 12 (Belknap, 1971) (describing the original position in greater detail).
145. One might, in fact, argue that residents of some impoverished locale would, on an ex
ante basis, accept limited shareholder liability in exchange for economic development, jobs, and
the like. Making this argument would be a healthy exercise. Even healthier would be some attempt
to involve community representatives in an actual bargaining process, or even some attempt to




If economists both began and ended their analysis with the "intui-
tively appealing," or "class one," arguments described above,1' 6 their
case in support of limited liability would be a good one. Even then, the
analysis would be incomplete; the class one argument merely states the
gross social benefits of limited liability and includes neither a refutation
nor a weighing of its costs.
Of course, economic analysis does not begin or end with class one
arguments; actually, these arguments do not really require economic
theory at all. The place where economic theory becomes critical is
"class two."'14 7 Although the "hyperrational bargaining" model may
strain credulity, it provides interesting insights into the ways that so-
phisticated lenders to corporations might conduct themselves. One of
the more troubling aspects of this type of economic analysis, however, is
that it clearly is intended to be normative. 48 That is, the proponents of
these arguments suggest that this is how creditors should, rather than
do or might, behave.'49
It is, however, in the "class three" or "real world simplification"
category that the most significant harm may occur. 150 The simplifying
assumptions and reductionist techniques of class three analysis prevent
the other levels from attaining more breadth and depth. More impor-
tant, this form of argument conveys a consummately uncaring, if not
callously indifferent, message about rights and responsibilities in
America today. Indeed, the class three arguments relating to limited
liability are quite typical of other assumptions for which the economics
movement has been taken to task or completely condemned.' 5'
III. THE FEMINIST EXPERIENCE
A. On Silence When There Is Nothing to Say
There has been, and continues to be, an explosion of interest in
feminist theories and methods.' 52 Nonetheless, there have been remark-
146. See Part II.C.1.
147. See Part II.C.2.
148. See generally Dworkin, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 191 (cited in note 90); Kronman, 9 J. Legal
Stud. at 227 (cited in note 90).
149. For further discussion of related criticisms, see Part IV.B.1. Note that the above-de-
scribed "high-tech" embellishments of the "logically compelling" class one economic arguments
share this normative character. See notes 105-07 and 110-11 and accompanying text.
150. See Part II.C.3.
151. See notes 86 and 90.
152. For just a few examples, see Symposium on Women and the Law: Goals for the 1990s,
42 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Symposium on Feminist Jurisprudence, 25 Tulsa L. J. 657 (1990); Sym-
posium, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 759 (1990). Several legal journals now are devoted entirely to feminist
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ably few applications of feminist theories and methods in areas related
to corporate law. 153 By contrast, the feminist literature on rape, pornog-
raphy, spousal battering, and family law has been profuse.15  This dis-
parity presumably results from the obvious and immediate relevance of
gender differences to this latter set of issues, rather than the disinterest
in business matters traditionally ascribed to women. 155
In fact, although feminist jurisprudence"" primarily has devoted its
specific analysis and commentary elsewhere, there has been no lack of
feminist political theory 157 focusing on aspects of the economy. s Thus,
for instance, feminist theorists have sought to demonstrate the perva-
sive, and sometimes devastating, effect of capitalist economic ordering
on the lives of women. 5 ' This discussion of modern market organiza-
tion has paid little particularized attention to accompanying legal struc-
tures. This, too, seems a natural choice of emphasis; to the extent that
feminist analysis of market economics to date has been profoundly crit-
literature. See, for example, Berkeley Women's L. J.; Harv. Women's L. J.; Yale J. L. & Feminism;
Wis. Women's L. J.
153. Actually, the only strictly relevant feminist analysis located by the author is contained
in Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholar-
ship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 Osgoode Hall L. J. 543 (1985).
154. See, for example, Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard, 1987); Diana E. H. Russell, Rape
in Marriage (MacMillan, 1982); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L. J. 1087 (1986); Harriett R. Galvin,
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70
Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Charlotte Germane, Margaret Johnson, and Nancy Leman, Mandatory
Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Dangers for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. 175 (1985); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-
Defense Claims, 67 Or. L. Rev. 393 (1988); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility,
and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Tes-
timony, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 395 (1985); Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 545 (1988);
Gerald D. Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System, 23
Crime & Delinq. 136 (1977); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 195
(1986); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 42 U. Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1989). This listing could continue at some length.
155. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983) (criticizing the traditional dichotomization of men's and
women's spheres of interest and influence).
156. "Jurisprudence," unmodified, has been defined as "consist[ing] of the general theories
of, or about, law." Edwin Wilhite Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 2 (Founda-
tion, 1953).
157. Patterson distinguishes jurisprudence and political science largely in terms of the inten-
sive scrutiny by the former of the work of courts, leaving to the latter the study of "the structure
and functioning of the other departments of government and the general theory of the state." Id.
at 53. For purposes of this Article, the only distinction intended is one focused on the level of
scrutiny attaching to the operation of specific legal principles and doctrines.
158. See, for example, Zillah Eisenstein, ed., Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist
Feminism (Monthly Review, 1979); Marilyn Waring, If Women Counted: A New Feminist Eco-
nomics (Harper & Row, 1988).
159. See the authorities cited in note 158.
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ical and has called for clean-sweeping change, attempts to rehabilitate
individual legal constructs may appear premature.160
Are there, however, additional reasons that feminist agendas have
ignored corporate and related topics? Is it arguable, for instance, that
our present market economy is so dominated by historically male values
that feminist inquiry simply has no immediate respons. other than gen-
eralized invocation of the concept of "oppression"? Or that feminists
simply have realized that addressing a corporate law audience on femi-
nist conc-arns would be, for the speaker, a sublime waste of time and,
for the most indulgent in the audience, an exercise akin to observing an
embroidery demonstration at a board meeting? As the discussion below
will indicate, the answer, as to so many multiple. choice questions, is
both all and none of the above.
B. Themes and Variations
1. In the House There Are Many Rooms161
Although there are many feminist concerns,'62 these concerns share
a common focus on the position of women in a patriarchal society and
on methods of expunging patriarchy. 6 3 In the words of one commenta-
tor, the uniting feminist task is "to name, expose, and eliminate the
unequal position of women in society."' 64 To the casual reader, this sug-
gests that feminist corporate law analysis should be at an end if women
are admitted to board rooms and corporate offices. In fact, to such a
reader, feminist corporate law analysis need never have started because
employment discrimination law-a different subject-is both adequate
to, and more appropriate for, the task.
160. At worst, such attempts presumably would weaken the force of arguments that sound
primarily in socialism and signal an unintended willingness to compromise.
161. Compare John 14:2 ("In my Father's house there are many rooms; if it were not so I
would have told you.").
162. Some feminists now regularly talk of "feminisms" rather than "feminism" in order to
reflect the diversity of a theory for all women. See, for example, Sandra Harding, The Science
Question in Feminism 244 (Cornell, 1986); Elaine Marks and Isabella de Courtivron, eds., New
French Feminisms (Univ. of Mass. 1981); Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The
Difference Method Makes, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 753 n.11 (1989).
163. Linda J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma's Se-
duction Statute, 25 Tulsa L. J. 775, 780 (1990). It also has been said that "one threshold observa-
tion is difficult to dispute. Feminism takes gender as a central category of analysis." Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617, 617-18 (1990); see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Gender and Jurisprudence: An Agenda for Research, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 521, 523 (1987) (stating
that "a research agenda sensitive to feminist values would ... reflect not a common theory but
rather certain common commitments" and that "[s]uch an agenda would remain attentive both to
women's concrete experience, and to the ways that such experience varies").
164. Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections
on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 352, 353 (1988) (book review).
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More reflective readers, however, will recognize that inequality also
inheres in "one size fits all" social and legal institutions. Thus, an actor
may experience unequal treatment-6 5-and personal discomfort-if re-
quired to function, in a setting that is adapted to the values, abilities,
and needs of others dissimilar to that actor and that therefore fails to
accommodate, much less reflect, the actor's own values, abilities, and
needs.
Translated into a constitutional law analogy, 166 the problems
presented are somewhat reminiscent of those suggested by the First
Amendment's promise of freedom of religion, with its perplexing inter-
face of the principles of free exercise and nonestablishment 6 7 In the
case of feminism, however, the problems are compounded because the
suppressed values (1) are not religious ones and thus are not protected
by the First Amendment, and (2) have not been articulated by elders in
any conveniently dogmatic form and therefore cannot be uniformly un-
derstood. In fact, even expression of the problems felt by feminist com-
plainants is impeded because traditional vocabulary and traditional
conceptualizations are inapplicable. For instance, the concept of free-
dom to exercise one's values may be at odds with the very values that
are held. 18
The freedom of religion analogy is one derived from liberal, rights-
based jurisprudence, which gives primary credence to the importance of
the individual.'69 As such, it would be objectionable or meaningless to
165. This reference to unequal treatment is colloquial and not intended to invoke Fourteenth
Amendment principles. The dangers of invoking the vocabulary of equality are, of course, manifest
to anyone familiar with feminist literature. See also notes 181-84 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. 1 (1985); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279 (1987); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325
(1985).
166. The analogy is acknowledged to be an imperfect one. This imperfection is a function of,
among other things, a lack of concepts common to feminist and traditional constitutional analysis.
See note 168 and accompanying text.
167. See, for example, Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law of Church and State and the
Supreme Court 112 (Aldine, 1962) (stating that conflict is avoided as long as the law avoids confer-
ring benefits and imposing burdens on the basis of religious classifications); John E. Nowak, et al.,
Constitutional Law 1031 (West, 3d ed. 1986) (stating that there is a "natural antagonism between
a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice"); Jesse H. Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673
(1980) (resolving conflict by construing the Establishment Clause as only forbidding government
action undertaken for religious purpose and likely to coerce, compromise, or influence religious
beliefs).
168. See notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
169. The importance of individual rights in the United States has been said to have both
political and environmental roots: political owing to the need to justify the war of independence
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some feminists.'70 Nonetheless, it may help explain the division of tasks
among various feminist thinkers. Thus, at any given time, some femi-
nists may concentrate on articulating and applying the values that they
believe many women hold and eventually may be encouraged to ex-
press. 7 1 Some may devote themselves to examining the relationship to
gender differences of traditional concepts such as freedom and equal-
ity.'72 Others may choose to critique the larger structure of which these
traditional concepts are but a part.173 Inevitably, these choices will re-
sult in analytic gaps and divergences, some of which may appear, and
actually be, at immediate odds.
174
2. The House Tour
Systematic identification of analytic divergences, much less imposi-
tion of labels upon those divergences, inevitably will reduce some
amount of crucial detail to meaningless abstraction. Although this is an
against the British crown; environmental as a result of the need to confront frontier conditions
during the 19th century westward expansion. See Maxwell H. Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a
Changing Society, 1776-1876 at 92-102 (Harvard, 1976); Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims:
The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750-1800 at 136-90 (Cambridge, 1982).
170. See, for example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Women's Rights, Affirmative Action, and
the Myth of Individualism, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 338 (1986). See generally Annette Baier, Trust
and Antitrust, 96 Ethics 231 (1986); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1574 (1987); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 Fern. Stud. 342 (1980). But see Rhode, 42
Stan. L. Rev. at 633-34 (cited in note 163) (describing benefits conferred by rights-based ap-
proach). See also notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
171. See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice 5-23 (Harvard, 1982); Robin
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L. J. 81, 140-41 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 13-42 (1988). These authors acknowledge, however, that the distinctions between
the values held by men and women are not absolute. See id.
172. See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1 (1975); Kenneth L. Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984 Duke L. J. 447; Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984). See also the authorities cited
in note 184.
173. See, for example, Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law (Harvard, 1987); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(Harvard, 1989); Olsen, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 1497 (cited in note 155); Ann C. Scales, The Emer-
gence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L. J. 1373 (1986).
174. See Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Writing a Woman's Life 19-20 (Norton, 1988); Kit Kinports,
Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 413, 414; Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 619 (cited in note
163). Martha Minow discusses such divergences among the various branches of feminism and goes
on to refute the value of consistency. Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F.
115, 136; see also Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist
Thought 176 (Beacon, 1988) (stating that different voices in feminist analysis are a "sign of our
empowerment" rather than a threat to coherence); Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Gen-
der Solidarity: Using*Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 11-12, 34-35
(1990) (recognizing divergences in strategies); Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging
the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1186-87 (1991) (same).
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inherent pitfall of human communication, 175 it is one that many modern
feminists abhor and attempt to resist.1 6 Nonetheless, for those unfa-
miliar with feminist literature, it may be expedient to provide terms
that may be used to suggest a feminist's then-prevailing concern with
the overall feminist task."7' This Article's use of these terms does not
suggest that there are rigid delineations between approaches, or that
one feminist may not vary her approaches and concerns as occasion and
conversation suggest appropriate.
a. Liberal Feminism
Liberal feminism seeks the common value of improving the posi-
tion of women in society.'7 8 Feminists employing this perspective accept
the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition as a given, either through
intellection or practicality, and seek equality for women within its
terms.' 79 They tend to utilize, then, a "rights-based" philosophy, which
works well so long as the rights in question are within ordinary liberal
cognizance. The rights to vote and to work the same hours and at the
same jobs as men, for instance, have been well served by liberal
feminism. 80
Inevitably, however, when rights collide,18' rights-based analysis
creates perplexities of the rock-hard place, irresistible force-immovable
175. See, for example, Elizabeth Mertz, Preface: Alternative Paradigms for Legal Theory, 83
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1152,
1167-70 (1985) (stating that language is socially constructed and, rather than being a neutral de-
scriptive tool, is a manipulator of understanding).
176. See, for example, Jeanne L. Schroeder, History's Challenge to Feminism, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 1889, 1889 n.3 (1990) (book review). But see Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and
Losing It, 38 J. Legal Educ. 47, 51 (1988) (stating that "[c]ognitively, we need simplifying catego-
ries, and the unifying category of 'woman' helps to organize experience, even at the cost of denying
some of it").
177. For similar distinctions, see, for example, Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of
Equality, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 803, 829-41 (1990) (identifying liberal, radical, cultural, and postmodern
schools of feminist thought); Crain, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 1186-92 (cited in note 174) (discussing
cultural, radical, and critical race strands of feminism); West, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note
171) (discussing cultural-radical dichotomy).
178. See notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
179. According to Deborah Rhode, "legal rights have a special resonance in our culture...
they are less readily dismissed than other progressive demands." Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 634
(cited in note 163). See also Kimberlb Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1366-69
(1988); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401 (1987).
180. See, for example, Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
Yale L. J. 1860, 1875-77 (1987); Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 635 (cited in note 163); Schneider, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 589. It is quite probable that some of these goals have been better served than
they would have been by some other feminist approaches. See Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 634.
181. Such collisions are sometimes perceived to occur between maternal and fetal rights. See,
for example, Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Chi. L.
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object, and free exercise-nonestablishment variety. Moreover, when
rights-talk is understood in terms of the right of one group to be
treated the same as another, when in fact presently relevant and immu-
table intergroup differences exist, these problems are exacerbated. One
therefore occasionally encounters such supposed conundrums as
whether denying insurance coverage to all pregnant persons, be they
male or female, is sex-equal treatment. 182 Given that the Supreme
Court has answered that question in the affirmative, 18 3 a further ques-
tion arises as to whether the position of women in society indefinitely
can be improved by a classically liberal framing of issues.18 4 As a result,
many feminists who otherwise may hold traditionally liberal ideologies
have drawn on additional arguments and techniques. Conversely, femi-
nists perceiving inadequacies in liberal rights agendas nonetheless may
seek to "recast their content" and "to build on the communal, rela-
tional, and destabilizing dimensions of rights-based arguments.'
' 8 5
b. Socialist Feminism
Socialist feminism has developed "a socialist critique of capitalism
that takes account of gender."' 8 Those embracing it have argued that
capitalism not only has alienated workers from their labor and con-
sumption from production, but also has separated family life and repro-
duction from the "productive" economy. 8 7 The all-powerful economy
Rev. 1219 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconcilia-
tion of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 Georgetown L.
J. 641 (1981). They also may occur between maternal and paternal rights and between the rights of
white males and those of "affirmative action" candidates.
182. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
183. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484. Congress overturned the Geduldig result by passing the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
184. For example, problems presented for women by the "equalization" of alimony standards
have been identified by Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America 163-214 (Free Press, 1985); Sally F.
Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. Family L. 351, 370
(1988-1989); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How Stereotypes About Women In-
fluence Judges, Judges' J. 12, 50-52 (Winter 1985).
185. Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 635 (cited in note 163); see also Lacey, 25 Tulsa L. J. at 789
(cited in note 163) (stating that "[e]ven if the criticisms of liberal feminism are valid, as I person-
ally believe they are, they do conveniently ignore one significant aspect of liberal feminism: to a
limited extent, it works."); Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1417 (1984) (stat-
ing that an approach similar to the one described by Rhode has been employed by other critical
theorists); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
561, 612-16 (1983) (same).
186. Lahey and Salter, 23 Osgoode Hall L. J. at 549 (cited in note 153).
187. Dorothy E. Smith, Women, The Family and Corporate Capitalism, in Marylee Ste-
phenson, ed., Women in Canada 17 (General Publishing, 1977).
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has, in turn, intruded into the family and reproductive cycle of at least
the middle-class worker, transforming both into reflections of, and
breeding grounds for, capitalist values.'88 Female laborers, particularly
those working within the home, thus experience exploitation and deval-
uation to a degree unequalled by the experience of males. 189
Contemporary responses to the socialist feminist analysis may not
purport a theoretical, point-by-point rebuttal. In other words, it may
for purposes of argument be gainsaid that capitalism has done every-
thing described above. The most predictable resistance offered will,
then, be a matter of competing value judgment, as in, "so what's so bad
about that?" This type of resistance has garnered empirical support
from recent political developments in eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. 9 ' The cogent modern response to socialism of any variety thus
seems to be, "Yes, but we've got blue jeans and liposuction and that's
what the world wants."
c. Radical Feminism
Radical feminism might well provide a ready answer to the mod-
ern, competing-value-judgment response to socialist feminism, and on
this point may converge with socialist feminism.' 9 ' The radical answer
to many questions is the same: virtually all modern societies have been
shaped by dominant male values.' 92 Accordingly, capitalism itself re-
flects an historically male emphasis on competitive profit-seeking and
property acquisition.'93 Similarly, it is male desires that have shaped
188. Id. at 32-33. See also Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797,
829 (1989) (describing the act of keeping women in the home described as a "capitalist tool to
privatize the costs of workers at the expense of women").
189. In other words, socialist feminists readily admit that male workers are exploited and
devalued but contend that the position of female workers is more dismal. See also Crain, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. at 1200-04 (cited in note 174) (discussing the economic function of occupational segrega-
tion). See generally the authorities cited in note 188.
For a general discussion of the failures of Marxism and socialism in dealing with the problems
of women, see, for example, Richard J. Evans, The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements
in Europe, America, and Australasia 156-77 (Croom Helm, 1977); Philip S. Foner, 1 Women and
the American Labor Movement 133, 271-85 (Free Press, 1975); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gen-
der, and the Family (Basic, 1989); Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and
Feminism in the Nineteenth Century at ix-xviii, 217-60 (Pantheon, 1983); Heidi Hartmann, The
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Toward a More Progressive Union, in Lydia Sar-
gent, ed., Women and Revolution 2 (South End Press, 1988).
190. See note 29 and accompanying text.
191. That is, although socialist feminism probably would give the same answer, it is not nec-
essarily the centerpiece of that approach.
192. See generally Andrea Dworkin, Letters From a War Zone (E. P. Dutton, 1988); MacK-
innon, Feminism Unmodified (cited in note 173); MacKinnon, Theory of the State (cited in note
173).
193. Compare Lahey and Salter, 23 Osgoode Hall L. J. at 555 (cited in note 153) ("For those
who are inclined to the radical feminist perspective ... the business corporation is a perfection of
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consumer demands. A world shaped by practical male desire is no bet-
ter than, and in fact no different from, a world shaped by male theories.
Men and what they want are on the top. 9 4 Women are on the bottom
and by reason of male oppression thus far have been prevented from
discovering what their own innate values and desires may be. 19 5
These basic contentions have been well stated and elaborated else-
where. 9" It appears that an important part of the radical agenda is to
educate the public that oppression exists in both flagrant and subtle
forms.9 7 Only in quite limited instances does radical feminism attempt
to change the law in any manner other than by strict admonitions to
men that they may not act in particular ways towards women.19 8 This
lack of concrete proposals for legal reform is understandable, given the
radical position that women cannot yet know the values they ultimately
may choose to express. 99 Thus, radical feminist approaches leave an
interim void in resolving many legal questions. Realizing this, the radi-
cal response is that it is as it must be, lest the energies and attentions
of women once again be co-opted and dissipated. 00
the masculist vision of self-existence as property, separation of accountability and enjoyment,
abstract rules as justice, domination as ownership"); see also Kathy E. Ferguson, The Feminist
Case Against Bureaucracy (Temple, 1984) (bureaucratic discourse is a refinement of liberal dis-
course and the distinctly male discourse of power).
194. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 8 (cited in note 173).
195. See the conversation among Carol J. Gilligan, Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Cathe-
rine A. MacKinnon, and Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, James McCormick Mitchell Lecture Series,
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law (Oct. 19, 1984), reprinted in Feminist
Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11, 73-74 (1985) (com-
ments of Catherine MacKinnon); Dworkin, Letters from a War Zone at 128-29 (cited in note 192).
196. See, for example, the authorities cited in note 192.
197. This has been said to be the primary task of feminist scholars as a group. See, for exam-
ple, Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ. 3, 8 (1988).
198. This admonition is an attempt to alleviate the most immediate forms of oppression.
Examples include the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon toward restraining the
use of pornographic images of women and children and toward eliminating sexual harassment. See
Paul Brest and Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornogra-
phy Movement in Minneapolis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1987).
199. See note 195 and accompanying text. For a related point concerning the silence of
women in the process of legal education, see, for example, Catherine Weiss and Louise Meling,
The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988); Stephanie M. Wildman,
The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. Legal Educ. 147
(1988).
200. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 Signs 515 (1982). For other expressions of concern about the dilution of women's contri-
butions, see Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1380 (cited in note 173); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question
Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. 64 (1985). Given
the radical feminist view that all present social institutions, including the law, are male constructs,
legal questions must be regarded as meaningful only in male terms, although the impact of such
questions is well-known to women through personal experience.
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d. Relational Feminism
Relational feminism reflects an effort to identify and apply in legal
and other inquiries a set of values based on the shared experiences of
women.201 Some of these values, such as compassion and caring, may or
may not be the product of centuries of male oppression.20 2 Nonetheless,
relational feminists perceive them as socially beneficial, as well as intui-
tively comfortable. 03 Thus, relational feminism regards women's physi-
cal "potential for connectedness" as a positive shaper of values to be
cherished,0 4 while radical feminism views this potential as the primary
factor exposing women to male invasion and exploitation.205
Relational feminists often adopt analytic methods that themselves
embody the values to be advanced. In fact, many, if not all, of these
methods have been developed by or in conjunction with other feminist
approaches. 20 Primary among these shared methods is the grounding of
analysis in the experience of women.20 7 Part and parcel of this ground-
ing is an emphasis on the actual context in which a particular problem
arises.208 Contextualization is thought critical because it arouses empa-
201. See Crain, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 1187-88 (cited in note 174); West, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
13-21 (cited in note 171). Note, however, the criticism that the experiences drawn upon are those
of privileged, white academics. See note 213 and accompanying text.
202. Various attempts have been made to explain the origins of the perceived differences in
the outlooks and goals of men and women. See, for example, Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 15 n.38
(cited in note 197); West, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 20-28. See also Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduc-
tion of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Univ. of Calif., 1978). For critical
discussion of this emphasis on "difference" between women and men, see, for example, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education or "The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. Legal Educ. 61, nn. 54-76 (1988); Joan W. Scott, Deconstruct-
ing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 Fem.
Stud. 33 (1988); Williams, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 813-21 (cited in note 188). See also Zillah Eisenstein,
The Female Body and the Law (Univ. of Calif., 1988) (deconstructing the notion of abiding differ-
ences between women and men).
203. For some of the nonjurisprudential work upon which relational feminism has drawn, see
generally Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (cited in note 202); Gilligan, In a Different
Voice (cited in note 171); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Edu-
cation (Univ. of Calif., 1984).
204. West, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 16-18 (cited in note 171).
205. See id. at 29.
206. Indeed, much of feminist method has nonjurisprudential roots. See, for example, Doro-
thy E. Smith, Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in Sandra Harding, ed.,
Feminism and Methodology 84-86 (Indiana, 1987); Hester Eisenstein, Introduction, in Hester
Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds., The Future of Difference at xv, xix (Barnard College Women's
Center, 1980).
207. See, for example, Littleton, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 764-65 (cited in note 162); MacKinnon, 7
Signs at 519 (cited in note 200); Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 621 (cited in note 163); Schneider, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 602-03 (cited in note 179). According to Deborah Rhode, "[r]ather than working
deductively from abstract principles and overarching conceptual schemes, such analysis builds
from the ground up." Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 621.
208. See Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 10-11 (cited in note 197); Henderson, 85 Mich. L. Rev.
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thy and exposes situational nuances that may permit case-specific ac-
commodations.10 Accordingly, rules derived or applied in abstraction
may be regarded as, at best, unreliable and, at worst, dehumanizing and
210oppressive.
Feminism thus understood appears in the throes of creating a novel
world vision, encompassing both a new value structure and a new ana-
lytic method. At the same time, however, its chosen method tends to
deny that visions should shape the world. This seems to translate into a
reluctance to address certain existing areas of legal abstraction, other
than to suggest that they should never have developed. It is one thing
to say that the "duty of care" in negligence law should be recast as the
"duty to care," 211 the consequences of which will be realized on a case-
by-case basis. Is it truly another-outside the self-defined scope of fem-
inism-to contemplate the tremendously impersonal American econ-
omy and its historically asserted "need" for transaction-facilitating
abstraction?
e. Analytical Feminism
Evident in much modern feminist writing is a trend toward un-
abashed self-referential analysis. Tendencies in feminist inquiry to date
are identified, criticized, and, in some cases, deconstructed . 12 For in-
at 1577 (cited in note 170); MacKinnon, 7 Signs at 537 (stating that universalizing reflects male
hegemony); Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. Rev. 613 (1986); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley
Women's L. J. 39 (1985); Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1388 (cited in note 173) (asserting that feminism
rejects abstract universality); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in
the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. Legal
Educ. 243 (1988).
209. Compare Menkel-Meadow, 1 Berkley Women's L. J. at 58 (discussing the avoidance of
abstract judgments as unworkable in particular cases). In this sense, "accommodation" may mean
compromise or the legitimate prompting of decision in one direction or another in order to reflect
the special circumstances of each case.
210. Compare Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 849
(1990) (discussing feminist "practical" reasoning); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 Yale L. J. 293, 321-26 (1988) (stating that individualized factfinding is often supe-
rior to the application of bright-line rules); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice
in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 604-13 (1986) (same).
211. Compare Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ, at 28-32, 33-36 (cited in note 197) (postulated duty
to aid based on feminist reasoning); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 884-97 (describing the ethos of
care).
212. Critical feminism and critical race feminism as self-identified schools manifest the
themes discussed in this section. See, for example, Sandra Harding, The Instability of the Analyt-
ical Categories of Feminist Theory, 11 Signs 645 (1986); Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 617 (cited in
note 163). Other writers, not identified with these schools, also exemplify this trend. Compare
Bartlett, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 829 (cited in note 210) (addressing the epistemological implications
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stance, the approach of theorizing from the experience of women is
quite aptly described as a process of "essentializing" that precludes
consideration of nonconforming experiences. 13 The difficulty of con-
fronting issues of concern to women without falling into the essentializ-
ing trap is articulated, as is the need to address "intersecting" forms of
oppression and injustice.214 The importance of avoiding Grand Theories
and, instead, focusing on concrete issues is emphasized and examined.
Ironically, although the tendency to essentialize may be condemned as
a type of hierarchical thinking that is typically and regrettably male,
the analytical process through which the condemnation occurs is sub-
ject to much the same criticism. In other words, theorizing about theo-
rizing, even with "gender as a central category of analysis, ' '215 is no
more nor less than a method of abstraction and prioritization. Simi-
larly, calls for concrete application are, when continued for some period
of time, striking in their lack of concreteness.
This observation does not mean that the described analysis lacks
worth or that all abstract thought should be replaced by applied emo-
tion. Rather, it recognizes that feminism and most feminist approaches
do, on at least some of their own terms, tend toward imperfection. The
ultimately nihilistic implications of this recognition need not, however,
be the primary concern of every feminist. Staring into the abyss is not,
after all, likely to improve the lives of women in any immediate fashion.
Moreover, perfection is itself an abstraction that has relatively little to
do with the experience (and thus, in some instances, the values and
goals) of women.
IV. POSSIBLE FEMINIST VIEWS OF LIMITED LIABILITY
A. Recapitulation
As described in Part II, limited liability is "about" the quantifica-
tion and allocation of risk.21 6 It permits particular actors-who are, in
fact, supposed to be nonactors-to calibrate the economic gambles that
they are willing to take. Presumably, these actors will take such gam-
bles when the perceived weighted probability21 7 of economic profit ex-
ceeds the perceived weighted probability of economic loss. The role of
of feminist legal methods).
213. See, for example, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 Harv.
Women's L. J. 115 (1989); Spelman, Inessential Woman at 176 (cited in note 174).
214. Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 626.
215. Id. at 617-18.
216. See especially notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
217. Weighted probability is determined by multiplying the possible magnitude of an event
by its probability. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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perception is quite critical: the large number of failing start-up busi-
nesses218 suggests that many such risk calculations were incorrect ab
initio.
2 19
The history of limited liability rules in America indicates that such
rules may reflect both a social purpose of stimulating economic develop-
ment, albeit in particular locations, 220 and a prevailing jurisprudential
attitude that legal responsibility should be a function of culpability,
which itself is a function of control.221 Economic analysis assures us
that a rule of limited liability is significant, if at all,222 because it en-
hances the profits of society as a whole. 2 This argument endorses the
historical view that a liability rule should stimulate economic develop-
ment. It does not, of course, address the responsibility-culpability char-
acterization; economic method elides consideration of such matters,




Feminist attitudes may be detected both with respect to tradition-
alist views of limited liability and with respect to economic views. The
latter merit a few words on their own, but cannot be completely sepa-
rated from the former.
1. Economic Man
22 5
The methods and primary assumptions of the law-and-economics
movement expose it to criticism from most feminist perspectives. Its
predisposition to work backward from a defense of the status quo226
and its delight in characterizing virtually all legal questions in economic
218. See note 6 and accompanying text.
219. If the initial assessments were correct, one would expect to find at least as many risks
"panning out" as not. On the other hand, the historical long-term increase in the Dow-Jones In-
dustrial Average and other indicators suggests that diversified betting on systemic profit generally
will be a winning gamble.
220. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of interstate
competition in the development of legislative attitudes toward limited liability.
221. It is important to note, however, that lack of responsibility was not itself traditionally
regarded as any kind of culpability. See notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
222. As explained in more detail at text accompanying notes 112-13, economists regard lim-
ited liability as the result willing parties would achieve if left to negotiate independently and thus
of slight significance.
223. See note 90 and accompanying text.
224. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
225. This heading was inspired by Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One
Contrast, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 867 (1988).
226. See note 88 and accompanying text.
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terms22 sets most of the movement at cross-purposes with liberal femi-
nism. Its free-market roots, enthusiasm for the separation of invest-
ment from other productive tasks as a form of efficient specialization,
and its emphasis on rational maximization of self-interest as the key to
social progress are, of course, hideously at odds with the goals of social-
ism, be it feminist or otherwise.2 28 The historical fact that the law-and-
economics movement was originally conceived and preponderantly es-
poused by men necessarily arouses the suspicion and antagonism of
radical feminism.2 2 9 Moreover, its insistent decontextualism, its refusal
to grant equal recognition to nonmonetary values, and, again, its as-
sumptions about rational self-interest as a laudable motivating force re-
present a world view that is jarringly inconsistent with that of relational
feminism. 230 These aspects of the economic perspective magnify a thou-
sand-fold the essentialism criticized by analytical feminism as present
in feminism itself.
231
In fact, some established philosophies have been reinterpreted in a
manner rendering them more compatible with feminist analysis. Thus,
for instance, the philosophy of John Rawls has been translated into
feminist terms.23 2 This exercise does not appear to be feasible with re-
spect to law and economics; one might attempt some sort of compro-
mise by suggesting overt and significant changes in assumption and
method,233 but no amount of honest restatement is likely to harmonize
economic and feminist differences.23 4
Given that the method is largely the message for both the law-and-
227. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 84-85 (Harvard, 1981)
(stating that "one must not overlook the possibility of extending the logic of certain nuisance cases
to Jews, blacks, and other racial, religious, or ethnic minorities"). This comment is discussed in.
Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner and the
Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 209, 252-53 (1988). But see Richard A.
Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 261 (1988).
228. See notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
229. See notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
230. See notes 201-10 and accompanying, text. Most readers will be familiar with the optical
illusion that the viewer may perceive as either an old woman or a young girl. This phenomenon
may serve as an analogy for the differing world perceptions of economists and relational feminists.
231. See notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
232. Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, 99 Ethics 229
(1989). But see Matsuda, 16 N.M. L. Rev. at 613 (cited in note 208) (criticizing Rawls from a
feminist perspective).
233. In this regard, see, for example, the recent literature that attempts to humanize eco-
nomics: Lutz and Lux, Humanistic Economics (cited in note 90); Lewis D. Solomon, Humanistic
Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Constituency Debate, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
234. This does not mean, however, that feminists should not draw on economic arguments.
See, for example, June Rose Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1463 (1990); June Rose Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig,




economics and feminist movements,3 5 it is clear that many feminists
could not tolerate, much less endorse, the economists' class two and
class three arguments about limited liability. Both the techniques of
utilizing simplifying assumptions (class three) and the adoption of
arm's-length rationality as a descriptive and normative device (class
two) dictate that economists remain firmly attached to a part of the
elephant upon which feminists have chosen not to place their hands.
A question remains, however, as to the shape of a feminist response
to class one arguments.3 6 These are arguments that economists have
produced or espoused but that have not really required economic analy-
sis. This question will be addressed in connection with possible feminist
assessments of the more traditional views of limited liability.
2. Betting the Farm
As an initial matter, it should be recognized that the naked ques-
tion of whether corporate shareholders should possess limited liability
is indeed somewhat outside the specific critical cognizance of the lib-
eral, socialist, and radical feminist approaches.137 Although some effort
at massage might result in at least moderate appeal to liberal introspec-
tion, there is no inherent link of this issue to the legal rights of women,
as opposed to those of men, and thus no reason for a liberal feminist
approach to limited liability to differ from a merely liberal analysis. 238
Socialist feminism has thoroughly condemned the corporation itself for
lacking ethical standards, separating labor and capital, and generally
facilitating the spread of capitalism. 23 9 The feature of limited liability
logically has enhanced at least the first two of these aspects, and quite
possibly the third;240 as a result, it necessarily would share the philo-
sophical fate of the entity it now seems to define.2 41 Radical feminism
235. To some extent, of course, all legal methods have a substantive component. See Bartlett,
103 Harv. L. Rev. at 844-47 (cited in note 210); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal
Method: The Difference It Makes, 3 Wis. Women's L. J. 147, 163-65 (1987). This point was recog-
nized nearly a century ago. See Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom
389 (Henry Holt and Co., 1886).
236. See Part 1I.C.1.
237. See Part III.B.2.a-c.
238. This Article does not purport to define the liberal approach to limited liability. Presum-
ably, however, it would emphasize the primacy of private ordering and generally deny the legiti-
macy of various social responsibility arguments. Compare Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia 32-33, 333-34 (Basic, 1974) (discussing the liberal ideal of inviolate individuals that are free
to realize ends with the voluntary cooperation of others possessing the same dignity).
239. See Smith, Women and Corporate Capitalism in Women in Canada (cited in note 187).
240. This depends on whether limited liability effectively encourages private forms of eco-
nomic organization.
241. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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presumably would characterize limited liability as part of the suspect
structure of the "master's house, '242 noting the instances in which it
may have facilitated the infliction of uncompensated injury on women
and other powerless groups.
Because relational feminism manifests a willingness both to claim a
special set of values and to employ special methods to evaluate how
well existing legal structures reflect those values, this approach emerges
as the most likely to justify and sustain a detailed scrutiny of the role of
limited liability in corporate law. The following discussion thus draws
heavily on the themes of relational feminism. At the same time, it will
occasionally employ the insights provided by other feminist voices; in
particular, analytical feminism, understood as a method of deconstruc-
tion concerned with the use of gender as an organizing category, may
provide a useful counterpoint. Above all, this discussion will rely heav-
ily on feminism's shared methods and goals.
The following analysis of limited liability will be postulated in
three parts. The first suggests the most general outline of a feminist
organizational model. The second assesses the role of limited liability as
a stimulant of entrepreneurship and investment. The third examines,
from a feminist perspective, the assertion that limited liability is a sim-
ple reflection of broader legal themes.
a. A Model for Organization
i. The Model Itself
As a first step, it is useful to contemplate the possible contours of a
feminist model for "productive" organizations. It must be recognized,
however, that the model will assume different contours depending on
the shape of the society in which it is to function. Thus, although ini-
tially posited as a feminist model to operate in a feminist society,
24 3
some redefinition will be necessary to accommodate social reality.
The very notion of modeling a generalized form of business associa-
tion may be problematic in feminism's own terms. Many feminists
would eschew the use of an abstract model for any purpose other than
to communicate a suggestion from which context-specific deviation is
expected and welcomed. Moreover, a feminist typically would not di-
chotomize "productive" and other forms of organization or separate
monetarily remunerated work-business or industry-from the rest of
life. In her view, efforts to produce food, clothing, forms of amusement,
and other goods and services should accommodate and incorporate rela-
242. Compare Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,
in Sister Outsider 110 (Crossing Press, 1984) (criticizing the approach of liberal feminism).
243. But see note 334 and accompanying text (questioning the vision of a feminist society).
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tionships with children and other loved ones and should permit an ac-
tor to express care and concern even for those with whom she is not
intimately involved.
This articulation does not necessarily return all human enterprise
to the cottage and log cabin,2 '44 but almost certainly would suggest the
development of organizations not closely resembling the modern corpo-
ration. These organizations clearly would be less hierarchically managed
than the entity contemplated by existing corporate law'45 and would
tend to be much smaller than many corporations are today.246 The first
modification would permit representation of more points of view and
life experiences and thus better, more contextualized decisionmaking.
247
Similarly, its flexibility would acknowledge the special talents of each
participant and permit shared or alternating leadership as appropriate.
The second modification would further assure the ability of decision
makers to contextualize the consequences of their decisions in terms of
their effects on immediate organizational participants, including em-
ployees, and on other constituents. These "other constituents" clearly
would include consumers and any other members of a community with
whom the organization were to interact.24 s
Moreover, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that an organi-
zation conceived by feminists would not feature limited liability. If
there were no other reason-and there are several 24 -one would be
provided by the destructive social impact of officially endorsing the con-
cept. Limiting liability is about imposing risks that someone else must
bear. Liability limitations artificially distance individuals from the real-
life effects of the enterprise in which they invest, thus decreasing their
acknowledged personal responsibility. Regardless of the legal effect of
the policy, the fact that limited liability is enshrined in the law can
inflict a separate harm by shaping values and social reality.
250
244. Compare Olsen, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 1568 (cited in note 155) (rejecting romantic returns
to simpler forms of life).
245. Compare Rosabeth M. Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 264, 266 (Basic,
1977) (stating that hierarchical structures result in the fragmentation of groups and, ultimately,
dichotomy, competition, and powerlessness).
246. Id. at 285 (noting that larger corporations produce problems of size, hierarchy, and orga-
nizationally induced sex differences).
247. See id. at 273, 276 (suggesting distribution of authority, improving access to informa-
tion, and increasing worker participation).
248. This also suggests that feminists would reject narrow formulations of fiduciary duty. For
a related suggestion not based on feminist assumptions or methods, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165 (1990).
249. See notes 250, 257-59 and accompanying text.
250. John Shotter, Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Inner Games, and Alternative Reali-
ties, in Geoffrey Underwood, ed., 3 Aspects of Consciousness 27, 34 (Academic, 1982) (stating that
"no matter what might happen in a person's world, it will be dealt with and understood. . . in the
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As a logical matter, the consequences of rejecting the concept of
limited liability are not limited to corporate shareholders. Feminists
presumably also would attempt to devise methods of discouraging sole
proprietors and partnerships from imposing risks that others ultimately
may be forced to bear.251 Even more dramatically, the reasoning of care
and responsibility would extend to lenders, landlords, and others hav-
ing contact with an enterprise. The employment of one's property for
personal profit at the price of uncompensated risk to third parties
would be unacceptable in all contexts. A response that lenders and
others do not control the actual use of their capital, or the precise risks
imposed, would be to no avail; the refusal to exercise all possible care
and to seek all practical involvement in decision making could itself be
regarded as a culpable omission. This policy would, of course, eliminate
many significant distinctions between equity and debt and would wreak
havoc upon capital markets as we know them, but political feasibility is
the subject of a later section.
ii. Risk-Shifting as Distinct from Passivity
As the application of the reasoning of care to the position of lend-
ers highlights, there are two possible lines of argument on limited liabil-
ity to be considered. The first condemns attempts to personally profit
while consciously risking injury to third parties.252 At first blush, this
argument seems to demand the abolition of limited liability. There
might be other possible methods of addressing the same problem, such
as substitution of equity requirements to be met before any business
association, including any sole proprietorship, is allowed to operate; this
latter approach, however, presents at least superficially confounding
practical difficulties. 5 3 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it ex-
hibits a rigid rule-orientation that is inconsistent with many feminist
methods and values.
terms already 'presupposed' in the communally acceptable ways of doing things in the person's
society."); Peller, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1167-70 (cited in note 175) (describing language as a manipula-
tor of understanding). See also the authorities cited in note 356.
251. See text following note 84.
252. The ostensible willingness of third parties to accept the risk would by no means elimi-
nate this criticism. As one feminist analysis of contract law has suggested, overreliance on assump-
tions of equal information and bargaining power are serious flaws in the American legal system.
See Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am.
U. L. Rev. 1065, 1132-33 (1985).
253. For example, it would be difficult to establish appropriate levels of capitalization for
different industries and differently situated entities within those industries, and it would be diffi-
cult to enforce these levels, once set. See, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at
1927-31 (cited in note 102). But see Part IV.C.2.b. for discussion of a requirement that business
enterprises carry adequate insurance.
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The second line of argument goes further, criticizing passivity when
involvement is possible. T.ius, ignoring the possible exploitation of
third pa 'ties as o.,e provides the means of exploitation 54 is a form of
failure tc, care. It ±, less extreme than deliberate risk imposition, but it
surely is at least as prevalent.
It would, of course, be both difficult and draconian to outlaw pas-
sive investment. 255 Nonetheless, the image of passivity is deeply in-
grained in market ideology '56 and current legal structures.257 In fact, the
passivity tradition is so strong258 that the simplest solution again seems
to be the elimination of limited liability.
Interestingly, the "intuitively appealing" or class one arguments
that the legal economists have supplied as the means to facilitate pas-
sive investment also suggest the means to discourage it. Thus, dissuad-
ing an investor from diversifying his investments might produce a
keener interest in the management of rei-aining holdings. An investor
would be less likely to diversify if limited liability did not exist. To the
extent that a lack of limited liability also contributed to a decline in
active trading markets, so much the better; being tied to an investment
for some period of time further should enhance interest in its
management.
The key difference between economic and feminist reasoning on
this point is, of course, the feminist belief that interest in monitoring is
a social good, rather than a duplicative waste.2 59 Such a belief implicitly
is rooted in the view that monitoring need not be exclusively directed to
the making of profit. As an illustration, suppose, for a moment, that
Ford shareholders themselves had been involved in resolving the issue
of the exploding Pinto gas tanks.260 Apart from any loss of secrecy issue,
is it likely that they would have voted "Yes, let the tanks explode"?
2 '
Is that how you would have voted?
254. This is no doubt related to the socialist critique described in the text accompanying
notes 186-88, but is distinct in terms of the type of fault perceived.
255. It must be recognized, for instance, that there always will be individuals who are physi-
cally, mentally, or emotionally incapable of anything but passivity.
256. See notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
257. See notes 65-84 and accompanying text. See generally Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990).
258. But see notes 277-78.
259. Note that after-the-fact imposition of legal liability is not an acceptable substitute for
prevention. This approach simply allows too much risk of underdeterrence and assumes that inju-
ries can be correctly priced. See notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
260. See note 22.
261. Management's willingness to so vote, though initially confounding, presumably is a
function of its perception that it has a legal duty to make profit, coupled with fear for its own
positions. There has, of course, been a longstanding debate over exactly what duties corporate
managers owe and to whom. For a historical perspective, see, for example, A. A. Berle, Jr., Corpo-
rate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corpo-
rate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For
Whom Are Cornorate Managers Trustees?. 45 Harv. L,. lRpv 1145 (1932): E. Merrick Dndrld .T T-
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iii. The Empire Strikes Back: Response of the Contractarians
Acknowledging that feminism rejects "hardcore" economic analysis,
it nonetheless may be relevant to the undecided to consider the eco-
nomic response to the postulated feminist position on limited liability.
Economists, of course, would say that if limited liability does not exist
as a foreordained legal structure, private parties will create it by con-
tract.262 There are several possible rejoinders.
First, one simply may choose to doubt the economists' assessment
that human motivation is universal in this regard. If limited liability
were not dangled as part of a business "kit" and if there were an ac-
cordingly increased social emphasis on personal responsibility, there al-
most certainly would be fewer attempts to claim limited liability.
Another credible response to the economists' claim might accept, at
least for purposes of argument, the proposition that the motivation to
achieve limited liability through contract will exist in some cases. The
next step could be to forbid the formation or to question the enforce-
ability of liability-shifting contracts. The latter approach would, for a
feminist, be the more likely; it would permit a case-by-case evaluation
and acknowledge that there might be good reasons for particular indi-
viduals, in particular circumstances, to enlist aid in bearing risk.
2 3
In yet another possible response, feminists might resign themselves
to the periodic formation of risk-shifting agreements and even grant
their usual enforceability. They nonetheless could be pleased that the
most obvious form of official endorsement of limited liability had been
removed and gratified that those who do not explicitly agree to accept
risk will receive some additional measure of protection.264
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 194 (1935). For a modern statement on the subject, see Section 2.01 of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Tentative Draft
No.2, April 13, 1984), which provides that "a business corporation should have as its objective the
conduct of [business] activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."
Id. at 28. Section 2.01 does, however, go on to add that a corporation may "devote a reasonable
amount of its resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."
Id. at 39. See notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
262. See note 113 and accompanying text.
263. More generally, from a feminist perspective it is clear that contracts need not ordinarily
be regarded as sacred icons. See notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
264. It is quite likely that shareholders deprived of limited liability would seek insurance
coverage. See the discussion in text accompanying note 369.
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b. The Effect on Entrepreneurship and Investment
i. Calling the Question
The foregoing discussion focuses on the value of unlimiting liability
and thus modifying social reality. This analysis, however, has not dealt
yet with the contention that limited liability promotes entrepreneurship
and investment, and therefore the desirable goals of technological and
other advancements. In examining the feminist reaction to this argu-
ment, it is useful to unbundle the primary concepts.
Entrepreneurship. To traditionalists,6 the term "entrepreneur-
ship" presumably conjures up the image of men in garages building
cars, airplanes, computers, and other useful devices, eventually mar-
keted to the public through entities that steadily and quickly increase
in size. The imagery is quite important here because it conveys a prom-
ise of progress for both society and the individuals involved. The tradi-
tionalist version of entrepreneurship is the Great American Dream, and
talking about entrepreneurship as a value keeps it alive. Economists,
however, reject the view of entrepreneurship in this traditionalist light;
they simply have recast the entrepreneurial function, identifying man-
agers and risk-bearers as the lead actors in modern business
scenarios. 66
The empirical fact of the matter appears to be that "being your
own boss" is, for most modern Americans, an impossible (rather than
great) dream. 67 Nonetheless, small business enterprises continue to
play a vital role in the economic life of America. Organizations with
fewer than 500 employees comprise four-fifths of all American busi-
nesses2 68 and provide one-half of the country's jobs. 21 9 Moreover, it is
265. As used in this Article, "traditionalist" loosely contemplates nonfeminist, noneconomi-
cally oriented legal and other scholars. This is, of course, a gross simplification.
266. See Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 288 (cited in note 111) (laying to rest the "attractive
concept" of "entrepreneur" and distinguishing the separate functions of management and risk-
bearing).
267. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, there were 117,342,000 persons employed
in America in 1989. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991, Table 649, at 393 (111th ed.).
In the same year, there were 10,008,000 self-employed. Id., Table 647, at 393. Those who are self-
employed are somewhat more likely to act in some routinized service capacity than to serve in the
role of captain of a start-up industry. Thus, while 3,924,000 of the self-employed reported them-
selves as engaged in "service," only 406,000 listed themselves as involved in "manufacturing." Id.
Independent contractors thus may or may not be living more pleasurable lives than they would as
traditional employees; viewed from a social perspective, however, they seem to perform similar
functions.
268. Harold C. Livesay, Entrepreneurial Dominance in Businesses, Large and Small, Past
and Present, 63 Bus. History Rev. 1, 4 (1989).
269. Id. See generally David L. Birch, Job Creation in America: How Our Smallest Compa-
nies Put the Most People to Work (Free Press, 1987).
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said that small companies developed one-half of the innovations now
reaching the market.
2 7 0
The symbols of entrepreneurship are not, of course, a feminist's de-
light. Neither rugged individualism manifest in solitary garage enter-
prise nor social progress as a function of self-interest reflect most
feminists' sense of themselves and the world around them. Still, as indi-
cated above, the limited initial size of the traditional entrepreneurial
enterprise carries substantial feminist appeal. To the extent that small
enterprises exist and produce scientific and other advances, the feminist
presumably would prefer to see them preserved. At a minimum, this
implies a lack of support for any proposal that might favor large busi-
nesses over small ones. For instance, any suggestion that limited liabil-
ity be abolished only for the shareholders of closely held corporations
would be coldly received.'
Investment. The term "investment," when juxtaposed with "entre-
preneurship," seems almost certainly to represent an intended contrast.
Since entrepreneurs are clearly "doers," investors evidently are "non-
doers." Here, the relevant traditionalist image may be that of the aged
widow timidly withdrawing from its hiding place a cash-filled sock.27 2 Is
it not better for all that her crumpled bills be put in circulation? And is
it not better for her that she receive the regular dividends or interest
payments that will sustain her in her final days?
Traditionalists and economists largely agree on the social value of
"investment," although economists may employ less emotive imagery
and more argumentative abstraction. Economists might, for instance,
claim that because the rational aged widow would herself be a high-cost
and therefore inefficient monitor, she indubitably would, if given a
chance, engage in a portfolio investment strategy in order to diversify
all nonmarket risk .2 73 The importance in the effectuation of this strat-
egy of institutional investors, an active trading market, and limited lia-
bility are, of course, implicit.
Feminists are not unsympathetic to aged widows. They are, how-
ever, more likely than the inventors of any patronizing traditional im-
270. Livesay, 63 Bus. History Rev. at 4 (cited in note 268) (referring again to companies with
fewer than 500 employees).
271. See note 337 and accompanying text.
272. The more relevant contemporary usage may be that of the institutional investor in
whom, in turn, the widow invests. See notes 115-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
incentives and motivations of such investors. If the widow's use of the institutional surrogate is
mandatory-i.e., owing to participation in a compulsory pension plan-individual confidence argu-
ments become less relevant.
273. See note 110 and accompanying text. The individual presumably will invest through an
institutional surrogate whose own ability to diversify would, because of its more substantial asset
base, be even more threatened by lack of limited liability than would the ability of the individual
(a nice bit of circularity).
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age to appreciate the ability of the stereotypically unsophisticated to
understand their options. At the same time, they are considerably more
likely than hardcore economists to appreciate individual diversity, the
making of subjectively influenced choices, and, in some cases, the sub-
jective inability to choose.
Most importantly, feminists can maintain their sympathy for the
widow and still quite easily reject the black and white world view em-
bodied in the entrepreneur-investor imagery and terminology employed
above. The fact that one is neither "captain of one's own ship" nor a
least-cost monitor does not necessarily dictate complete apathy as ei-
ther a rational or desirable reaction. If rationality is a matter of seeking
personal gratification, a feeling of responsible participation may be
more pleasurable, and thus more rational, than apathy. This is particu-
larly true if the effort required for participation is not itself
unpleasurable.
It is no answer to say, ipse dixit, that if ordinary investors wanted
to participate they would do so.2 7 5 There is a history and a power to the
traditional imagery and an array of legal impediments to investor in-
volvement 27 6 that both reflect and perpetuate the active-passive dichot-
omy of entrepreneurs and investors. Permitting realistic and effective
investor participation may require some reconstructive effort, but that
does not prove the perfection of the status quo. This realization comes
easily for those whose nontraditional values played little role in shaping
present social and legal reality.
There are, in fact, developments already afoot in the investor par-
ticipation line. Examples include social consciousness movements at-
tempting to influence corporate actions with respect to apartheid,
affirmative action, animal welfare, and a broad spectrum of environ-
mental issues.27 7 In addition, institutional investors have begun to test
their ability to claim incremental involvement in more traditional man-
agement prerogatives, such as the nomination of directors.2 7 8
274. Economists would not necessarily deny this proposition but probably would consider it
unhelpful. See Posner, Economic Analysis at 12 (cited in note 88) (stating that this use of "willing-
ness to pay" to measure efficiency avoids the extreme subjectivism and arbitrariness otherwise
likely to result); Werner Sichel and Peter Eckstein, Basic Economic Concepts 403 (1974) (discuss-
ing the futility of interpersonal utility comparisons).
275. With respect to the increasing participation by institutional investors, see Black, 89
Mich. L. Rev. at 570-75 (cited in note 257). See also notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
276. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 530-36 (discussing impediments).
277. See, for example, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985)
(shareholder sought inclusion in managements proxy solicitation of proposal relating to force-feed-
ing geese); see also Hamilton, Corporations at 672 (cited in note 2) (listing recent activist propos-
als); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 11.7 at 502-510 (West, 2d ed. 1990)
(citing recent proposals).
278. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 97 (cited in note 69); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Govern-
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Accordingly, the concept of investment as historically understood
should be moderated for purposes of further examination. Deleting pas-
sivity as an automatic or necessary part of the investor's image ulti-
mately will clarify the issues of whether it is better for everyone to take
money out of their socks and whether limited liability relates to this
assumed goal. In answering these questions, the term "enterprise par-
ticipant" will be used to refer to the investor as thus recharacterized.
ii. The Benefits of Enterprise Participation
This subsection separately considers the benefits of enterprise par-
ticipation from the perspectives of individual participants and of soci-
ety as a whole. This division is not intended to suggest that these
perspectives are necessarily different but simply to recognize that they
are, as a matter of tradition, differently framed. A key feminist insight
is that individual and collective interests need not be in opposition and
frequently may converge. In other words, the culinary aphorism that it
is necessary to break eggs to make omelets need not dictate one's con-
ceptualization of individual participation in collective activity.
The Perspective of the Enterprise Participant. In view of the fore-
going discussion and of some feminist views of human nature,79 depriv-
ing the widow of her limited liability is not strictly necessary to jolt her
out of apathy concerning the possible social misuses of her funds. The
question remains whether granting her limited liability nonetheless is
necessary to get her life savings into circulation. This answer is more
equivocal.
A feminist might hope that potential enterprise participants will be
enmeshed in a web of social support; as aged widows have cared for
others, others will care for them.280 In this light, the risk of participat-
ing in an enterprise could be dramatically different than hitherto per-
ceived. In a society steeped in feminist values, it thus might not be
effectively possible to "bet the farm" since various networks would as-
sure that "all" could never be lost. We do not, of course, live in such a
society. What, then, of the enterprise participant in actual context?
Absent risk, participation in some kind of enterprise would seem
indisputably to be of economic and personal benefit to the partici-
pant. Risk aversion, 28 1 however, is easy to understand in today's
ance in the Nineties: Managers v. Institutions, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 357 (1990). See note 350 and
accompanying text for a brief discussion of the feasibility and desirability of a feminist-institu-
tional investor alliance.
279. See notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
280. This may cause an ostensible "loss" of independence, but, from a feminist perspective,
no necessary loss of dignity.
281.. Economists have explained the concept of risk aversion as follows:
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America.282 In this connection, there is no particular reason to think
that feminists would be less risk-averse than any other group.2 83 In
other words, it would be surprising to find them flocking in dispropor-
tionate numbers to risk their family homesteads and livelihoods in the
name of social benefit or otherwise. It would not, however, be startling
to find them conscientiously striving to participate only in humanely
managed enterprises that make no attempt to impose risk on
others-compensated or otherwise.
This insight is helpful in that it suggests still further "unbundling."
Whereas limited liability traditionally has permitted personal profit
while imposing risks on others-risk-shifting-risk aversion may be
seen as a question of avoiding risk to oneself and to those to whom one
feels most immediately connected.284 This does not, from an en-
trepreneurial or any related perspective, expressly require imposing risk
on others. Such impositions of risk, however, may be a function of
greed, indifference to the problem of the commons,2"" or indifference to
the market abstractions imposed by years of sheer market size, aug-
Where an outcome is uncertain, the economist speaks of it as an 'expected' outcome. The
'value' of an expected outcome is the dollar value (or cost) of the outcome if it occurs, 'dis-
counted' (i.e. multiplied) by the probability of its occurrence.. . . However, the 'utility' of the
expected outcome may differ from its 'value.' Utility may, for present purposes, be defined as
the price that an individual would consider equivalent to the expected outcome. Stated differ-
ently, the utility of the expected outcome is the sum certain that is subjectively equivalent to
the expected (uncertain) outcome. If the utility and value of an expected outcome are identi-
cal for some individual, that individual, at least as regards the transaction in question, is said
to be 'risk neutral.' If the utility to him is less than the value, he is 'risk averse'; if it is greater
than the value, he is 'risk preferring.'. . . Economists believe that most people in most set-
tings are risk averse; studies of the securities markets . . . have provided . . . quantitative
evidence in support of this belief.
Richard A. Posner and Kenneth E. Scott, Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regula-
tion 62-63 (Little, Brown, 1980).
282. See Jerry Adler, et al., Down in the Dumps, Newsweek 18 (Jan. 13, 1992) (describing
Americans' economic and other worries).
283. See Stuart H. Blum, Investment Preferences and the Desire for Security: A Compari-
son of Men and Women, 94 J. Psychol. 87 (1976) (noting that the difference in the degree of
emphasis placed upon security in investment preferences between men and women is not statisti-
cally significant).
284. It might also extend to avoiding risk to a larger circle; the statement in the text is
minimalist in nature.
285. The "problem of the commons" or "free rider" problem results from a reluctance to
engage in optimal levels of a particular activity, such as monitoring, because the benefits of the
activity must be shared with persons not contributing to the activity. See Charles J. Goetz, Cases
and Materials on Law and Economics 27-28, 90 (West, 1984); James M. Buchanan, The Demand
and Supply of Public Goods (1968); James M. Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A
Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Debate, 10 J. L. & Econ. 193 (1967); Paul A. Samuelson, Pit-
falls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10 J. L. & Econ. 199 (1967); Jora R. Minasian, Public Goods
in Theory and Practice Revisited, 10 J. L. & Econ. 205 (1967). Compare Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968) (examining the concept in the context of
overpopulation).
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mented by decontextual economic analysis.
The argument, then, is that the human interest in connectedness,
the economically rational realization that collective enterprise can ac-
complish more than either individual action or, certainly, nonaction
(the sock strategy), and some accommodation of risk aversion will in-
duce enterprise participation as a clear-cut benefit to the participant.
Money will move from the sock drawer and into circulation, although it
may not be in the hands of the exact entities economists would
prefer.2" 6
The Social Perspective. In addition, there remains the putative
link of both entrepreneurship and investment to social progress. The
foregoing arguments do not suggest that feminists disdain technological
progress. Feminists might, in retrospect, have been quite happy to tol-
erate a somewhat slower rate of some forms of advancement; nonethe-
less, they probably would be as anxious as anyone for the improvements
in health, nutrition, and the like, that technology has rendered. They
would prefer that these advances occur in the context of small, sympa-
thetically managed concerns, and would prefer to regard such concerns
as capable of producing them. 87 Given the realistic admission that
small, sympathetically managed concerns are not the necessary order of
the modern day, what then? The next task is to develop an approach
that accommodates some appropriately targeted accumulation of as-
sets,2"8 encourages individuals to participate in management, and as-
sures that understandably risk-averse and potentially helpless persons
can fearlessly dedicate their funds. This approach cannot practically as-
sume a feminist ground-zero and thus must somehow account for both
history and the reality perceived by others.28 " Its precise shape will
await the commentary on broader legal themes, immediately below.
286. See note 111 and accompanying text. It would be important to acknowledge more fully
the costs of sacrificing large, aggressive corporations or active markets if either of these sacrifices
were a practical possibility. See notes 287, 336-38 and accompanying text.
287. Resolution of this last point is, however, the type of abstractive argument that is not
necessary for feminists to address in light of the practical circumstances that many such advances
already have occurred, that small enterprises have contributed to their attainment, see note 270,
and that those large organizations that do currently exist are not in the process of disintegration.
288. This simply recognizes that feminists might regard accumulating assets for immuniza-
tion research quite differently from accumulating assets for development of weaponry. See Ann C.
Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 Harv.
Women's L. J. 25 (1989).
289. For instance, it must recognize that the hostile world some feminists claim is perceived
by men may be real to them. The approach thus must somehow soothe male fears. At this point, it
may be helpful to recall the liberal feminist willingness to deal with the law in vocabulary appeal-
ing to powerful listeners. See notes 179-85 and accompanying text. This is, by design or conse-
quence, a form of "practical" feminism.
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c. Reflections of Larger Legal Themes
i. Industry as Favored Child
Legal historians have noted that the first half of the nineteenth
century saw enormous flux in the laws affecting budding American in-
dustry.29 ° It was during this period, for instance, that caveat emptor
and the "will" theory of contract supplanted the "sound price" doc-
trine,291 that negligence doctrine preempted "no fault" trespass as our
dominant tort theory,292 and that the distinct natures of corporations
and their shareholders began to weave their way into the fabric of
American society.2 93 According to Professor Morton Horwitz, once these
pro-industry developments became firmly established, they were "fro-
zen" into the law as the courts turned to a rigidly formalistic method of
legal analysis.
29 4
The broad legal themes that support limited liability may coincide
with those in vogue at the time of its firm New World entrenchment.
According to at least some historians, these themes will not coinciden-
tally tend to favor industry. 95 One such theme, manifest in both nine-
teenth century negligence and corporate law, is a willingness to sever
the chain of legal liability unless the connection between individual ac-
tor and injury is compellingly direct.296 Another, shared by contract and
corporate law in the same period, is an emphasis on the utility of pri-
vate ordering and arrangements in the economic sphere. 97
Thus, as posited in Part II of this Article, the shareholder's formal
lack of control over corporate activity easily can serve as a theoretical
290. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 at 253-55
(Harvard, 1977).
291. Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror 119-20 (Oxford, 1989); Horwitz, American Law at 164-
66, 180; Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 233-35, 244-47 (Simon and Schuster,
1973); Morton J. Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 917,
945-46 (1974); A. W. B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 533 (1979) (criticizing Horwitz).
292. Horwitz, American Law at 297-98 n.146; Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to
Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359, 360-70 (1951) (also discussing development of "fellow ser-
vant" and "assumption of risk" doctrines). See also G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An
Intellectual History (Oxford, 1980); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth
Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L. J. 1717 (1981).
293. See notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
294. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 251-53 (1975).
Compare Stephen B. Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: Towards a New American Le-
gal History, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 700 (1977) (criticizing Horwitz).
295. See the authorities cited in note 292.
296. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text. In instances in which the corporate veil is
pierced, then, such a connection may be found. See notes 66, 125-31 and accompanying text.
297. In this sense, both bodies of doctrine encourage individual or limited group accumula-
tions of capital for the enhancement of the general welfare. For the usual economic view of this
approach see notes 26, 91 and accompanying text.
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barrier to liability for corporate acts.2"" Moreover, in the case of those
having contractual dealings with the corporation, what could be more
natural to the jurist asked to pierce a corporate veil than respect for the
manifest will of the parties as to who is liable and who is not?299 Oddly,
however, these themes have substantially eroded in tort and contract
law, yet they continue to be enshrined in corporate law.
ii. Separate Spheres
Modern courts are relatively sanguine about the ability of industry
to survive and prosper. Accordingly, various doctrines have been de-
vised or modified to hold businesses legally liable for their products.
Culpability is no longer an inevitable essential to liability, °00 and the
importance of showing strict causality has diminished.301 Other judicial
innovations have reduced the predictability of contract rules. Uncon-
scionability, reliance, and other doctrines thus have made inroads on
contractual formalism.0 2
By contrast, there seem to be no truly parallel developments in im-
posing liability on corporate shareholders.303 Piercing the corporate veil
is hardly more popular a judicial pastime today than in earlier years
and certainly is no better understood.3 04 Moreover, relaxation of the
formal restrictions on shareholder control of close corporations30 5 actu-
ally has reduced the theoretical justification of shareholder claims to
limited liability. Various other developments, such as the relaxation of
control restrictions on limited partners30 6 and the invention of other
298. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
299. This thinking also underlies common-law acceptance of the corporation by estoppel and
de facto corporation doctrines. See Ribstein, 50 Md. L. Rev. at 121-24 (cited in note 9) (suggesting
rent-seeking as the reason for statutory amendment of doctrines). With respect to the significance
in actual veil-piercing inquiries of whether the debt in question is contractual or otherwise, see
Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1058-59 (cited in note 83).
300. See Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts §§ 75, 98 at 536-38, 692-94 (cited in note 71).
301. See generally Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 916 (cited in note 72) (basing liability on market
share); Sheiner, 46 Fordharn at 963 (cited in note 72) (same).
302. The most famous expansion on these themes is, no doubt, contained in Grant Gilmore,
The Death of Contract (Ohio State, 1974). See also Richard E. Spiedel, An Essay on the Reported
Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1975) (discussing and criticizing
Gilmore).
303. But see notes 19-20 and accompanying text with respect to recent instances in which
CERCLA provisions have been employed to impose liability on corporate parents actively "operat-
ing" hazardous waste sites through subsidiaries.
304. There is now, however, more of an empirical basis for further discussion on the issue.
See Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1047-67 (cited in note 83).
305. This relaxation has been both legislative and judicial. See the authorities cited in notes
69 and 81.
306. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303, 6 U.L.A. 343-53 (Supp. 1992). Georgia has
dropped the control restriction entirely. See Ga. Code Ann. Section 14-9-303 (Michie, 1989).
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limited-liability forms 30 7 have pushed the law of business organizations
further adrift from other legal principles.
To an observer in 1992, business law and organizational law may
appear to be quite different subjects. The former, which relates to the
responsibilities and obligations of an enterprise to the larger society,
has undergone substantial change and, in some respects, might be said
to have been at least slightly "feminized" vis-A-vis its state in the nine-
teenth century.30 8 The latter, which articulates the relationships of
those within the enterprise to one another and sustains their lack of
relationship to those outside the enterprise, remains mired in earlier
theory. 0
Business law and organizational law thus may be characterized as
occupying quite distinct spheres. The spheres intersect only in the of-
fices of corporate management:3 10 management, of course, must respond
to the demands of business law in order to discharge its responsibilities
under organizational law. 1'
In this regard, the extraordinary difficulty evident in the most re-
cent manifestations of the corporate constituency debate illustrates the
separateness of the two spheres. 12 When, for largely selfish reasons,
313
corporate managers became interested in establishing that there might
indeed exist some leakage between the world and the hitherto hermeti-
cally sealed universe of corporate fiduciary duty, their only resort was
to the legislature. 14 Those statutes that, as a result of their efforts,
307. See, for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-80-101 (1991); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608 (West, 1992);
1990 Kan. H. B. 3064; Wyo. Stat. §§ 17-15-101 to 17-15-136 (1977). See generally Hamill, 41 U.
Fla. L. Rev. at 721 (cited in note 9); Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company
Act, 11 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 387 (1983).
308. See notes 290-94 and accompanying text.
309. Note the traditional lack of responsibility by managers to groups other than sharehold-
ers. See notes 261, 312-15 and accompanying text.
310. An intersection also occurs on the rare occasions on which the corporate veil is pierced.
311. See generally Ryan, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 413 (cited in note 23) (discussing fiduciary
responsibility to comply with general law).
312. See generally Richard A. Rodewald, The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate: Un-
answered Questions About the Consequences of Moral Reform, 25 Am. Bus. L. J. 443 (1987);
Fischel, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 1259 (cited in note 87). In modified forms, this debate has continued
since the Berle-Dodd exchange cited in note 261.
313. It is, of course, an open secret that management hoped to invoke constituency interests
as antitakeover, self-entrenchment devices. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituen-
cies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253 (1990); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time
for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. 55, 63 (1991); Ellen Lieberman and Jeffrey B.
Bartell, The Rise in State Anti-Takeover Laws, 23 Sec. & Commodities Reg. 149 (1990).
314. Although courts grant substantial leeway to directors in methods of advancing share-
holder interests, the judiciary has indicated quite resolutely that "it is not within the lawful pow-
ers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely
incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefitting others." Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
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cracked the hermetic seal are striking in their lack of guidance about
how to value and accommodate the arguably competing interests of va-
rious constituencies.
315
Why have the spheres of business and organizational law developed
in isolation? Or, rather, why has one sphere developed much faster and
more dramatically than the other? These evolutionary patterns suggest
that the separation of capital from business must not only have seemed
natural in light of historical enthusiasm for industrial development but
also must continue to seem natural.
At this level, there is ample room for speculation about a favored
capitalist superclass to which lawyers, judges, and legislators at least
subconsciously pander and aspire."' Socialist theory 1 7 presumably
would accommodate the idea that class distinctions are both reflected
in and sustained by legal structures. Less controversial theories could
support the same theme. Thus, from a simple, rugged individualism
Horatio Alger"1 8 standpoint, what could be seriously wrong with permit-
ting those who have hoisted themselves from the masses to ernjoy a few
well-protected rewards?
A less hostile or image-driven explanation for this divergence could
be a simple collapse of imagination after the period of legal formalism
was reached. 19 This explanation is suggested by the general failure of
At last count, 29 legislatures had adopted some sort of multi-constituency statute. Bevis Long-
streth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. 113, 115-16 (1991).
315. Id. See also, for example, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1721(c) (1988), repealed by Act of Dec. 19,
1990, Pa. Laws 834, No. 198, § 102:
Consideration of factors-In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of
directors, committees of the board and individual directors may, in considering the best inter-
ests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, upon suppliers and
customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other establishments
of the corporation are located, and all other pertinent factors. The consideration of those
factors shall not constitute a violation of [the directors' duties of care and loyalty].
A vigorous commentary has attempted to illustrate the folly of tinkering with the traditional
view in this area. See, for example, Longstreth, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 314). But
compare Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. Law.
1355 (1991) (generally concluding that such statutes are not apt to influence the law significantly).
316. Compare Horwitz, American Law, at 188 (cited in note 290) (reflecting on "class bias"
in law). Recent restrictions on insider trading might tend to contradict this theme. See note 335.
317. See notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
318. Horatio Alger (1834-1899) was an American author known for 130 popular books "based
on the concept that a struggle against poverty and temptation inevitably leads a boy to wealth and
fame." James D. Hart, The Concise Oxford Companion to American Literature 11-12 (1986). His
career as an author flourished after his 1886 ouster as a Unitarian minister for having immoral
relations with his choirboys. Id.
319. This might be partially induced by American liberal reluctance to require affirmative
acts. In this sense, control is a given: it simply exists or does not exist. In the case of shareholders
it does not exist, but in the case of enterprises it does. It presumably would seldom occur to liberal
thinkers to compel someone to seek to control. See Alan Brown, Modern Political Philosophy 81,
92 (Penguin, 1986) (same); Nozick, Anarchy at 26-28, 149 (cited in notf, 238) (same); Richard A.
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legislators and judges3 2° to question seriously the centrality of agency
theory to the law of organizations.
As a historical matter, agents act subject to the control of the prin-
cipal.3 21 Shareholders lack the formal ability to control and thus cannot
be principals. As a second historical matter, agents act on behalf of the
principal.322 Corporate management is in fact and law in control, but by
law cannot act on its own behalf.32 3 Thus, the single possible principal
is the corporation itself-an entity whose only animating conscience is a
balance sheet. There is nothing wrong with this conclusion as a matter
of formal nineteenth-century logic, but the neglect by modern
lawmakers to inquire further-to examine whether agency law is the
best possible construct for determining organizational relationships-is
perplexing.
There is an explanation, admittedly quite partial, both for the con-
tinuing failure to critically examine agency law as the basis for organi-
zational law and for the development of business law and organizational
law as separate spheres. That explanation is the power of the law-and-
economics movement.2 4 The existence and strength of the movement
have for a substantial period of time diverted academic attention from
more traditional explorations that ultimately might possess more ap-
peal for judges and legislators.
Law-and-economics adherents themselves tend to reject traditional
images and constructs.325 They thus have denounced the cherished im-
age of the corporation as a separate entity, replacing it with a "nexus of
contracts.3 s26 They have provided, however, their own relatively com-
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 198 (1973) (placing individual auton-
omy and liberty to choose not to act-in duty-to-rescue cases-over human needs for assistance in
times of danger).
320. But see notes 326-30 and accompanying text for discussion of the efforts of the law-and-
economics movement.
321. Restatement of the Law on Agency, § 1 (cited in note 76).
322. Id.
323. For a general discussion of the prohibitions against management self-dealing and the
related prohibition against the usurpation of corporate opportunities see, for example, Jayne W.
Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988 Wis. L.
Rev. 237; Victor Brudney and Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 997 (1981); Michael Begert, Comment, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and
Outside Business Interests, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 827 (1989).
324. Propounding the division may be some amount of unintended collusion between tradi-
tional American liberalism and the law-and-economics movement. This is manifest in the ideology
of freedom of contract. "Freedom"--of will or otherwise-is an appealing liberal value. Contractu-
alization is a centerpiece of economic analysis and thus enhances the importance and credibility of
the movement.
325. Law-and-economics scholars have discussed agency law in their own terms. See, for ex-
ample, Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1988).
326. See, for example, Baysinger and Butler, 71 Va. L. Rev. at 1257 (cited in note 87); Wil-
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plete explanation for the "natural" division between investment and
other spheres. This explanation, which reinforces the division but does
nothing to force traditionalists to reexamine the agency construct, is as
follows.
Economic theory suggests that capital provision is a task in which
one must specialize to achieve maximum efficiency; because it is a dis-
crete task, it naturally may have rules that differ from those for other
tasks. The economic argument, nonetheless, is that underlying these
facially divergent rules are identical themes of wealth maximization.
Thus, requiring an enterprise to bear the costs of product injuries is
wealth-maximizing in those circumstances in which the enterprise is the
lowest-cost avoider of such injuries. 27 Because investors themselves are
not low-cost avoiders but relatively high-cost interferers, involving them
directly in product liability would be inefficient; conversely, reducing
their involvement would maximize wealth. Isolating ordinary investors
both from enterprise liability and control is therefore quite desirable.
Moreover, to the extent that wealth maximization, narrowly de-
fined, is the goal of the entire analysis, it is easy to understand why no
serious challenge is mounted-or intended-to the traditional idea that
the balance sheet is management's principal.328 Even if economists dis-
claim the corporate entity for purposes of organizational law analysis
and regard management as acting on its own behalf except as limited
by contract, threat of takeover, or other practical monitoring device,329
the net effect on society of the contracts entered into by creditors, man-
agers, and investors does not seem dramatically different from the re-
sult that would be achieved if management were bargaining with
creditors on behalf of the corporation rather than on its own behalf.
330
liam W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History,
41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989); Butler, 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 87); Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989).
327. This analysis does not suggest that strict liability always will result in optimal resource
allocations. See Werner Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis 225-30 (Aca-
demic, 2d ed. 1988) (stating that no one rule is best in all cases); Polinsky, Law and Economics at
95-104 (cited in note 91) (same). Note that, for this purpose, something like an entity is more or
less assumed. In this regard, see generally Coase, 4 Economica at 386 (cited in note 85).
328. Admittedly, legal economists tend to focus on the market (or other bargained for) value
of shares, which incorporates many financial factors in addition to the corporate balance sheet.
329. See Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 288 (cited in note 111); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & Econ. 327 (1983); Fama and Jensen, 26
J. L. & Econ. at 301 (cited in note 85); notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
330. It is little wonder, then, that if economists are saying, "Look, you can think about it this
way," lawmakers often seem to answer, "Why bother?" See note 335 and accompanying text.
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iii. And Back to the Feminists
Feminists presumably would applaud some of the developments in
what was referred to above as business law. Product liability doctrine,
for instance, can double as a "needs" based theory, providing help for
those with need and thus enhancing society's capacity to care for its
members. 31 Unconscionability, as a context-specific response to rigid
contract formalism, also should represent a definite improvement to the
feminist thinker." ' Moreover, the importance of reliance as a justifica-
tion for enforcing promises has substantial feminist appeal.33
The hypothecated enthusiasm for these developments necessarily,
if unsurprisingly, suggests that feminists would deplore the nineteenth
century state of the law. To the extent that the themes of that era re-
verberate in present day organizational law, they will continue to incur
feminist criticism. The totemism of "will," the rigidity of on-off answers
to participant liability questions, and any notion that individuals regu-
larly may be severed from the nonbeneficial consequences of acts from
which they themselves were intended to benefit are in any guise objec-
tionable to feminists.
Also deplorable to feminist analysis would be the ritual segregation
of various social and legal structures. In other words, the existence of
separate spheres for the various tasks of life is disquieting. Compart-
mentalization requires abstraction, and abstraction values order over
context, thus precluding care.
C. A Practical Feminist Solution
1. Goals and Constraints
a. The General
Practicality dictates recognition that there will be no immediate re-
structuring of society along purely feminist lines. Some critics might
applaud this truism, noting that failure to accommodate diverse non-
feminist values would be no more fair than the existing failure to ac-
commodate feminist points of view. These critics would simply mis-
perceive feminism, which seeks to accommodate diversity in any non-
hierarchical form.
331. See Nancy Fraser, Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contents as Political Conflicts in
Welfare State Societies, 99 Ethics 291 (1989) (arguing for translatability of justified needs claims
into social rights).
332. See notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
333. This can be attributed to a focus on need rather than bargain, accompanied by a rem-
edy that is also needs-related rather than based on lost profits. See Restatement (Second) of Con-




A superficially more telling criticism of a purely feminist society
might take the form of a concern that social constructs, including laws,
intended to reflect caring and other feminist values may lack deviance
control measures and thus may be abused. In addition, such constructs
might reflect a lack of willingness, and therefore a lack of capacity, to
address certain large-scale, abstract institutional problems that already
exist.
These criticisms illustrate the folly of abstract projection of design
or consequences and emphasize the reasons that feminists themselves
usually eschew utopian visions. 34 Because feminist analysis is firmly
grounded in nonutopian experience, it will not, on its own terms, prop-
erly dictate a complete theoretical retooling of society or, for that mat-
ter, of corporate America. Its most important contribution thus is apt
to be a more immediate, if incremental, one. This contribution is the
accomplishment of such minimal change as would permit feminists to
participate in corporate life without undue discomfort, in the hope that
permitting at least some effectuation of personal philosophy within pre-
existing frameworks could lead to further evolution.
At this time, the auspices for some amount of nonstructural femini-
zation may be relatively good. The public imagination is seized by the
moral and other perils posed by large corporations. Powerful institu-
tions are interested in various investor empowerment reforms. A little
carpe diem may be in order.
b. The Specific
As indicated above, a feminist generally would disapprove the con-
cept of limited liability. Nonetheless, she might find nothing particu-
larly amiss in the concept of limited risk and might regard various
investor empowerment reforms as helpful in liberating any par-
ticipatory impulses currently stifled by legal and economic tradition.
Certain political and other practical realities will, of course, con-
strain any specific suggestion or set of suggestions advanced in the hope
of actual adoption. For instance, a recommendation overtly based on
334. See Rhode, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 636 (cited in note 163). The main benefit of insisting on
purity of theory, and thus of describing "feminist solutions" that are workable in "feminist socie-
ties" is to avoid dilution and the risk of ultimate silence. Nonetheless, fringe groups historically
have imposed a gravitational pull on society even if they seldom succeed in reshaping it entirely.
They must, however, be at least on the fringe of society and not completely beyond its borders.
This is the most cogent response to the inevitable criticism that will attach to an "add and stir"
approach such as the one proposed in this Article. See Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ.. at 29 n.111 (cited
in note 197); Minow, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 55 (cited in note 176) (saying that "we risk becoming
embroiled in what we critique, entranced by what we would demystify"); Iris M. Young, Difference




socialist theory or values would not be currently feasible. A feasible rec-
ommendation need not, however, conform exactly to the preferences of
the law-and-economics movement: legislators have, in recent years, ex-
hibited a cheerful indifference to strict economic analysis. 33 5
At a minimum, the practical feminist will recognize that eliminat-
ing limited liability, either for shareholders or lenders, is roughly as
probable as the selection of a female Pope. To the extent that limited
liability is linked to active trading markets and other vital economic
factors,336 fear of interstate and international competition is almost dis-
positive of the issue. 3 7 Thus, absent worldwide adoption of unlimited
liability, the threat of capital flight would seem to preclude serious po-
litical consideration of such a move in any discrete jurisdiction, be it a
state or the nation. 38
Even without these difficulties, tle exposure of shareholders to lia-
bility would raise perplexing problems of implementation. For instance,
would liability be joint and several or pro rata? A recent, economically-
oriented article arguing for the imposition of tort liability on a pro rata
335. They have, for instance, chosen to "interfere" in the market for corporate control, thus
burdening potential acquirers of publicly held corporations and thereby reducing the efficiency of
the monitoring device so praised by economists. See, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case
for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 33-38
(1982); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1030-32 (1982); notes 105-07 and accompanying text. They
have, moreover, refused economic advice with respect to the regulation of insider trading of securi-
ties, characterizing as serious wrongdoing what is, to many economists, a neutral or beneficial de-
vice. For discussion of the economic view, see, for example, Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547 (1970); Henry G. Manne, Insider Tracung
and the Stock Market (Free Press, 1966); Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial
Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 Bell J. Econ. 23 (1977). For the legislative re-
sponse see The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (1988); The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
336. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
337. Although imposing liability on the shareholders of closely held corporations might be
severable, and slightly more feasible than imposing it on publicly held corporations as well, there
are reasons to resist such a severance. Among other things, it would appear to enhance any com-
petitive advantages that larger corporations already enjoy in attracting capital investment. See
note 271 and accompanying text. Moreover, it would appear to endor., "separate sphere" thinking,
as well as decontextualization and passivity, in the unaffected realm.
338. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1922-23 (cited in note 102), argue that the
law of the jurisdiction in which business is conducted should be applied and that such a jurisdic-
tion may effect:vely prohibit a foreign entity from conducting business if its shareholders have not
waived limitations on liability. Although their statement with respect to choice of law seems cor-
rect, their assessment of the ease with which the organizations of the world may be brought into




basis discusses additional practical difficulties at some length."' 9 When,
for instance, would liability attach?3 40 At the time of injury? The time
of discovery? The time a claim is made? How would manipulation be
avoided? Moreover, what about the theoretical obstacles and practical
costs presented by collection? 4' Despite the genuine appeal to feminist
audiences of the basic suggestion, the struggle with these mundane is-
sues overwhelmingly burdens an already politically dicey proposal.
2. A Recommendation
There is, however, a simpler and, presumably, more politically fea-
sible approach that still would address immediate feminist concerns.
The first step would call for the adoption of various investor empower-
ment reforms. The second would retain limited liability for sharehold-
ers and lenders but would impose a requirement that all business
enterprises, corporate or otherwise, carry adequate insurance.
a. Investor Empowerment
There now exists a fairly rich literature discussing the merits and
demerits of various methods to empower investors.342 Proposed meth-
ods include facilitating the communication of information among share-
holders, 43 enlarging the range of matters that shareholders may call
upon management to include in its annual proxy statement,3 44 and de-
veloping a "new breed" of professional director elected to represent the
interests of institutional investors. 45
Progress of sorts already has begun.346 This progress does not indi-
cate that the current state of investor participation is satisfactory, how-
ever; 4' the continuing waves of proposals indicate that, in the views of
339. Id. at 1896-902; Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1578-84 (cited in note 142).
340. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1896-99.
341. Id. at 1899-901.
342. See, for example, Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 520 (cited in note 257); Alfred Conard,
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 117 (1988); George W. Dent,
Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881, 908.
343. See Karmel, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 83-85 (cited in note 313).
344. Id. at 84.
345. See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991).
346. Thus, the SEC has proposed various proxy reforms popularly regarded as pro-investor.
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rptr. (BNA) 895 (1992).
347. Some might argue that any such progress is more apparent than real. Thus, while there
have been numerous reform proposals, presumably heightening sensitivity in this area, few of these
proposals have been adopted. See Karmel, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 64-67, 83-84 (cited in note 313);
Longstreth, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 314). Some commentators have denounced as
steps backward such events as the D.C. Circuit Court's invalidation of the SEC's "one share-one
vote" rule, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (1990), and various developments in state
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many, much remains to be done. Nonetheless, recent interest and ac-
tual developments in this field suggest that feminists need not wage
this particular campaign alone. This area, therefore, presents a promis-
ing opportunity to attain practical results and to provide willing femi-
nists a relatively rare opportunity to apply their theoretical tools quite
directly to the world of business.3 48
From a critical perspective, it should be acknowledged that to the
extent that investor empowerment schemes are successful, investors
might obtain more of the control that seems to render the state of un-
limited liability "natural.3 49 If, for the reasons described above,350 that
state is in no event perceived to be forthcoming, a projection of the
drawbacks of unlimited liability onto shareholder empowerment might
preclude empowerment reforms in the first place. Fortunately, however,
the vanguard of the shareholder empowerment movement includes po-
litically powerful institutional investors not apt to be troubled by the
theoretical asymmetries of their own demands.
3 51
Nonetheless, in the sharp eye of the legal economist, investor em-
powerment would be of doubtful utility, particularly to the small inves-
tor. The economic model suggests that rational, diversified investors
simply will not involve themselves in the management of business en-
terprises . 52 As animal-rights sympathizers and anti-apartheid activists
have shown, however, economic rationality can be quite overrated.
s35
b. Adequate Insurance
Different readers will place primary emphasis on different criti-
cisms of the proposal that all business enterprises be required to carry
adequate insurance. The primary such criticisms concern the following:
(1) the impracticability of propounding schedules of adequate insur-
ance, (2) the theoretical and practical difficulty of enforcement, (3) the
unavailability or expense of insurance against contract liability and
some types of tort liability, (4) the immorality of quantifying possible
approaches to antitakeover devices. See Karmel, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 72-81 (cited in note 313).
348. One of the goals of such an application would, of course, be erosion of the line separat-
ing this world from the rest of life.
349. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
350. See notes 335-40 and accompanying text.
351. To the extent that institutional investors would become more powerful to the exclusion
of other types of investors, new problems might arise. Adding a layer of actors between individuals
and ultimate consequences might decrease individual feelings of connectedness, responsibility, and
control. This concern could be a matter of mere imagery, however; if investors have choices about
their institutional surrogates, they might perceive themselves as responsibly pooling their efforts
with others of like mind.
352. See notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
353. See note 277 and accompanying text.
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human injury in insurance dollars, and (5) the moral hazard posed by
insurance.
Some criticism may be deflected by rendering the proposal more
precisely. Let us presume that the relevant enforcement mechanism is
some type of sanction against individual management 354 and that it will
apply only when a private claimant is unable to recover from the enter-
prise. Detection thus would be in private hands, which admittedly
would allow some instances of inadequate insurance to go unexposed.
Enforcement against management w"ould be far simpler than penalizing
shareholders and would permit the capital markets to continue rela-
tively unperturbed, although any increased cost of insurance or man-
agement salaries presumably would have an effect on valuation.
Prudent managers might extract higher compensation for the new risk
they would bear, but nonetheless should be more likely to see that the
enterprise is adequately insured.
Adequacy of insurance need not be determined with scientific pre-
cision, and any pretense that precision is possible would be foolhardy.
Rather, for purposes of the sanctions described above, a conclusive pre-
sumption of adequacy might arise from compliance with the periodic
recommendations of a panel of community volunteers. Many such
panels could convene in each jurisdiction; in fact, their number need be
limited only by the exhaustion of civic spirit. A recommendation of the
amount of insurance to be carried by each enterprise would be issued
after a presentation by management and such supplementary investiga-
tion as the panel chose to make. Community involvement of this sort
would, of course, raise a few additional practical issues. Suppose, for
instance, that the panel acts capriciously and issues an unnecessarily
high recommendation? Suppose, in the alternative, that it is captured
by management and issues a recommendation that is too low?
In the event management thinks a recommendation is unduly high,
the enterprise probably should be able to submit the issue to a second
panel. If management disagrees with the second panel, the enterprise
might choose to disregard both recommendations, relying on (1) its own
informed opinion that the amount of insurance management chooses
would sufficiently assure that no private claimants would be uncompen-
sated or (2) its belief that it could prove that a reasonable person would
have concluded that the amount of insurance chosen by management
354. These sanctions could be any appropriately calibrated form of criminal or civil penalty.
One possibility would be to impose liability on management for unpaid corporate debts. For dis-
cussion of such a proposal without respect to any mandatory insurance requirement, see Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L. J. 857, 869-
71 (1984). See also Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1929 (cited in note 102) (generally
dismissing the proposal to impose unlimited liability on management).
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was adequate, notwithstanding the opinions of the panels. Nonetheless,
if recommendations are high, the proposed system admittedly might re-
sult in some instances of overinsurance.
Conversely, the problem of regulatory capture presents the distinct
possibility of underinsurance. The issue of capture is, of course, one
that is always with us.s 55 However, assuming that community volunteers
are subjected to the same governmental ethics restrictions, including
sanctions, that govern professional regulators, the capture problem
should be no more extreme in this area than in any other.
In summation of this particular problem area, there need be no
claim that instances of overinsurance and underinsurance will be negli-
gible or cancel each other out on a systemic basis. At least some of the
benefits of the proposal are intended to be symbolic-because symbols
are important. Labels, for instance, quite apart from content, help
structure our perception of reality and thus our response to it. 56 If an
adequate insurance requirement permits us to conceive of entities in
terms of limited risk, rather than limited liability, this simple adjust-
ment ultimately may affect our perception of permissible economic
goals and, consequently, our economic morality.
Several other practical issues, however, still remain. First, suppose
that the panel bases its recommendation on an evaluation of the books,
records, and business plan presented by management, but that these
materials are incomplete. Or suppose that management simply changes
its plans post-presentation. Do these possibilities indicate that the risk
of evasion is unacceptably high? Open flaunting of even a largely sym-
bolic regulatory structure clearly is not to be desired.
At a minimum, the possibility of evasive actions suggests that man-
agement should bear the burden of establishing that the enterprise's
actions were within the realm of those contemplated by the panel at the
time the recommendation was issued. Thus, when invoking the protec-
tion of the conclusive presumption of adequate insurance, management
would have to demonstrate that whatever action is complained of was
fairly described in its presentation to the panel. The testimony of panel
members themselves in such situations themselves presumably would
be highly influential.
3 57
355. See, for example, David B. Frohmeyer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Sub-
stance, 66 A.B.A. J. 871, 871-73 (1980) (criticizing capture theory); Louis L. Jaffe, The Indepen-
dent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 Yale L. J. 1868 (1956) (discussing claims of industry-oriented
regulation).
356. Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Beacon, 1973); Dale Spender, Man Made Lan-
guage 163-90 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2d ed. 1985); Minow, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 51 (cited in note
176). See also the authorities cited notes 195 and 250.
357. Note that this line of reasoning suggests that community panel members should be af-
forded immunity from the consequences of a recommendation that results in underinsurance.
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Also in the practical realm is the criticism that some types of
risk-such as contract liabilities-are uninsurable. The demand placed
on an enterprise's resources by these types of risk would, however, be
considered in determining the amount of insurance to be carried against
other perils. Moreover, a panel might decide that an enterprise's unin-
surable risks are so great that the panel simply could not recommend
adequate insurance. This situation would expose management to some
risk of later sanction and thus presumably induce caution. The uninsur-
able risk problem would seem to affect small enterprises more than
larger "self-insurers," but this may be the inescapable consequence of
any attempt to match fiscal and moral responsibility.
Moreover, to the extent that some uninsurable risks are contractual
in nature, some amount of creativity may be in order. Suppose, for in-
stance, that unpaid debts to such quasi-voluntary creditors as employ-
ees would expose management to sanction if left unpaid and
underinsured.-35  Even if wage insurance is not now common, it is en-
tirely foreseeable that a new insurance product could be developed and
made widely available. Although such insurance clearly would not be
cost-free, neither is nonpayment of wages. The question to be resolved
is whether there should be community involvement in determining how
these costs are to be shared. 59
The primary remaining criticisms are more theoretical in nature
but no less significant. These concern the monetarization of injury and
the moral hazard of insurance. The latter, however, is the easier issue.
Insurance is said to create a moral hazard in that actors are more
likely to take risks if they do not bear the ultimate costs.3 60 Thus, if an
enterprise is fully insured, its safety precautions may decline. This
moral hazard is no different in kind than the one created by limited
liability itself. In the case of insured risks, however, it is the willing
insurance provider rather than some possibly unwilling third party who
is the ultimate risk-bearer in terms of dollar cost.361 This alone is an
improvement. Moreover, to the extent that insurance providers have
358. This contemplates either that any shortfall in an enterprise's ability to pay would be
charged against management or that management's exposure would be limited to specific types of
shortfalls, including amounts owed to employees.
359. This discussion is slightly blithe in its disregard of loading costs, which exceed one-
quarter of all insurance premiums. See Louis De Alessi, Why Corporations Insure, 25 Econ. In-
quiry 429, 432 (1987). It would also be possible to include specific informed releases of some types
of creditors in the "insured" category. These types almost certainly would not include employees.
360. Note that insofar as corporate entities are concerned, management decides which risks
to take, but does not directly incur the consequences. Nonetheless, the consequences of the risks
taken presumably will indirectly affect management's salaries, bonus plans, and continued
employability.
361. See immediately below for recognition that dollar compensation may not truly make
victims whole, indicating that they, too, are inescapably risk-bearers.
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the ability to impose certain restraints on the actions of the insured,
such as conducting periodic inspections of equipment in exchange for
reduced premiums on liability insurance, the real-world consequences
of moral hazard may be reduced. 62
More importantly, if business plans are exposed to community rep-
resentatives, the act of exposure itself is apt to serve as a moderating
influence. This would be true even if the community representatives
had a duty of nondisclosure until called upon to testify as to the availa-
bility of the conclusive presumption of adequate insurance. One can
easily believe that as management pictures itself articulating some par-
ticularly odious plan, which it presumably would have an incentive to
reveal in order to assure the availability of the presumption, it may find
ways to amend its original scheme. 63 The expense of amendment is,
like the price of insurance, a cost the recommendation presupposes a
concerned society is willing to bear.
Reliance on a plan of insurance clearly does accept the prevailing
legal and economic tendency to reduce all injuries to dollar valua-
tions. 3 64 Such reliance permits decision makers to detach themselves, as
human beings, from the consequences of their decisions to other human
beings. There presently is some interest in feminist circles in restructur-
ing tort remedies to combat the tendency to monetarize. Thus, for in-
stance, there have been recommendations that tortfeasors personally
render care to their victims.36 5 If this recommendation were adopted, it
might reduce the need for insurance as we know it.3 s6
More practically, it may be very well to say that in a society even
loosely structured on feminist principles, personal care would be prefer-
able to dollar recoveries. In our actual society, however, assuring ade-
quate funds for medical treatment and other needs is essential. In the
foreseeable future, then, personal care reforms may no more than sup-
plement the more traditional structure of remedies.
3 6 7
362. Consider also the argument that the payment of higher premiums for the privilege of
engaging in high-risk activities will have a moderating influence. Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 31).
363. It is thus apparent that the proposal made in the text has implications for the constitu-
ency debate described in notes 261 and 312-15.
364. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power,
and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L. J. 848, 853.
365. Id. at 905-06; Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 Tulsa L. J. 759, 771-
72 (1990).
366. A supplemental means of addressing the same problem would take the form of creativ-
ity in designing the sanctions for the failure to insure.
367. Nonetheless, the concern raised in the text suggests that effort devoted to refining the
concept of insurance would be time well spent, both in terms of the proposal made in this Article
and in general. Why, after all, should insurance always be monetary? Could it not take the form of
some other type of plan for responding to injury?
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In addition, what appears to someone who stands to profit from a
particular act to be no more than an offsetting loss on a financial state-
ment may look quite different to a community volunteer. Simply re-
minding management of that fact may have a moderating influence.
Thus, an executive might think more than once before announcing to
an insurance panel, "We know that our infant seat restraints will fail at
X rate, so we will carry Y amount of insurance."
As a final note, it is interesting to observe that, aside from sug-
gesting that there may be practical difficulties, as well as problems of
moral hazard, economists have been relatively receptive to mandatory
insurance schemes 68 This relative lack of objection may be slightly un-
nerving to feminist groups.
The economist's lack of objection is, predictably, premised on a be-
lief that a mandatory insurance scheme would tend to duplicate the
voluntary arrangements that would otherwise be made.36 9 It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that even if there already is a substantial
volume of voluntary insurance transactions, an insurance requirement
still has significance. The mandate of enterprise responsibility would
serve as an important affirmation of the social values of care and re-
sponsibility. Moreover, the significance of the opportunity for commu-




As the discussion in Parts I through IV indicates, the construct of
limited liability for corporate shareholders is firmly entrenched in
American law and society. There is, as well, substantial popular and
legislative interest in expanding its coverage to investors in other
entities.
Logical arguments establish the significance of limited liability for
the existence of an active trading market and the ability of investors to
diversify. As others have recognized, these arguments tend to support
limited liability for the shareholders of publicly held entities but not for
those of entities that are closely held. Supporting the extension of lim-
ited liability to both classes of shareholders is a set of traditional argu-
368. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 115 (cited in note 31);
Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1927 (cited in note 102). For a suggestion that a tort
of failure to insure adequately be recognized, see Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1632-36 (cited in
note 142).
369. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text; Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
107-09 (cited in note 31).
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ments about the need to stimulate investment and entrepreneurship,
respectively.
One contention of this Article is that, insofar as the foregoing argu-
ments are concerned, the concept of limited risk is a more than suitable
surrogate for limited liability. It is a further contention that limited risk
is a concept more compatible with the precepts of feminism. As a theo-
retical matter, it would be fairly simple to accomplish a substitution of
concepts by implementing a plan of mandatory enterprise insurance.
From a feminist standpoint, the mandatory enterprise insurance
plan has the distinct advantage of using community viewpoints to es-
tablish the adequacy of the insurance an enterprise will carry. To the
extent this involvement constrains other management decisions, the
further advantage of a moderating influence may be perceived. Overall,
it is hoped that community input will reduce the level of concern about
the moral and related hazards of insurance.
Reform in at least the corporate arena would be incomplete with-
out liberalizing the rules that constrain the ability of shareholders to
participate in management. In light of traditional agency and other le-
gal analysis, increased participation may create an imbalance: control
historically has been associated with liability, either direct or vicarious.
Amending the enterprise participant's position from one of limited lia-
bility to one of limited risk may or may not address this theoretical
imperfection. In either event, there is no particular reason to think that
the traditional model is the only one possible. For instance, a feminist
might find a lack of desire to participate in management itself to be a
kind of culpability justifying imposition of liability, were such an impo-
sition feasible. This is, of course, a rejection of the traditional model.
The attempt to address a basic concern with limited liability in any
sort of piecemeal fashion will, to some, lack aesthetic appeal. 70 One
person's clutter, however, is another's context. A drive to streamline ar-
ticulations of problems and to discover one true answer to the spare
models thus produced is, from a feminist's perspective, a profound flaw
in existing legal analysis.
B. And What About Todd?
All this being said, a year has passed since I first saw Todd. As the
dog days once again wear on, the cardtable and pitcher have reap-
peared, and the quarters again are starting to accumulate. I imagine the
370. Critics also quite correctly may contend that the concern with limited liability expressed
in this Article is a type of surrogate for expression of an opinion on the constituency debate. See
notes 261, 312-15 and accompanying text. The fact that the traditional model presents multiple
and intimately related problems should in no way be remarkable.
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scene repeating itself in various eastern European locales, with appro-
priate substitutions of currency.
The point is not, I suppose, consternation about "playing entrepre-
neur." Neither is it any serious worry about whether Todd has yet given
thought to incorporating. Rather, it is concern with the thoughtless ac-
ceptance and replication of the status quo. No matter how strong, how
traditional, some images may be, no matter how strongly ingrained
some values, there are questions worth asking. Not every group will, or
should, agree that these are our images and these are our values.
